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Abstract  
This thesis considers the role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Canadian 
banking sector. Although the relevance of CSR continues to be debated, this analysis 
starts from the position that CSR is now a fact of life for modern banks and tests whether 
Canadian banks are demonstrating CSR behavior through their adoption of the Equator 
Principles: a series of guidelines on the management of social and environmental issues 
that banks voluntarily commit to follow in their project financing activities. This thesis 
concludes that examples of CSR behavior can be observed as Canadian banks continue to 
define the scope of their involvement with the EPs. However, this conclusion is tempered 
by the finding that self-interested business motivations are also behind EPs adoption. Any 
expectations that we might arrive at “socially responsible” banks should therefore be 
tempered by the reality that CSR has yet to gain universal implementation in Canadian 
banking. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of Thesis Topic and Contribution 
 
This thesis considers the emerging role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
in the Canadian banking sector. Although the relevance of CSR continues to be debated 
in academic circles, the analysis for this thesis starts from the position that CSR is 
increasingly becoming a fact of life for modern Canadian banks. As a result, this thesis 
reflects the pragmatic view of commentators who claim that CSR is now a phenomenon 
that can be observed in varying degrees in the practices and behavior of modern 
businesses. Writers in this area argue that CSR has largely “won the battle of ideas” in 
that, practically speaking, few businesses today would argue against the need for CSR 
and it is likely to remain important to our political, regulatory, academic and corporate 
agendas.
1
   
The research proposition for this thesis is that Canadian banks are demonstrating 
CSR behavior through the steps they are taking to implement and comply with the 
Equator Principles (EPs). The EPs were chosen for study because they represent a 
potential real-world example of CSR: a voluntary framework “for determining, assessing 
and managing environmental and social risk in projects.”2 The EPs were developed by 
                                                 
1
 See e.g., Norman Keith, Corporate Crime and Accountability in Canada – From Prosecutions to 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2011) [Keith] at 254 and 275. 
   
2
 See online at: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep. As at the date of 
submission of this thesis, the EPs are undergoing an update process that will be implemented in 2013 and 
2014. A draft of the new principles (referred to in this thesis as EP III) was released for stakeholder 
consultation and public comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal comment period closed on October 
12, 2012. The updated principles were formally launched and are effective from June 4, 2013, but there is a 
transition period in place to allow banks to continue using the current version of the EPs (the EP II) until 
December 31, 2013. As such, this thesis focuses on the current version of the EP II (which are referred to 
generally in this thesis as the “EPs”) and the requirements they currently prescribe for member banks. 
Chapters 4 and 7 will provide a discussion of the EP III update process in order to support further study in 
this area as the updated principles are implemented in the second half of 2013 and into 2014. 
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major international private banks, together with the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the World Bank Group on June 4, 2003. At the time of writing, seven Canadian 
financial institutions (including all of the “Big-5” Canadian banks) have formally adopted 
the EPs: Royal Bank of Canada; TD Canada Trust; Bank of Montreal; Bank of Nova 
Scotia; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Export Development Canada; and 
Manulife Financial.
3
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing body of work on CSR in the 
financial services sector generally and in the banking industry specifically. CSR scholars 
and legal practioners now recognize the financial industry as a sector that is particularly 
relevant to CSR. They argue that the sector is relevant, not because of its own direct 
social and ecological footprints, but rather because of impacts that arise through 
allocation of capital to other business sectors, primarily in infrastructure development and 
natural resource exploitation.
4
 More to the point, scholars in this area argue that the EPs, 
taken together with other environmental and social initiatives, are evidence of a shift 
toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the banking sector.
5
  
                                                 
3
 See the list of EPs member banks online at: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/members-
reporting/members-and-reporting (accessed as of June 28, 2013). This list can be sorted by country or 
geographic region.   
  
4
 See e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for Canadian 
Environmental Law” (2003) 49 McGill L.J. 145 [Richardson-Financing Change] at 147-148. See also e.g., 
Paul Q. Watchman, Angela Delfino and Juliette Addison of the law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & 
MacRae, “EP 2: The Revised Equator Principles: Why hard-nosed bankers are embracing soft law 
principles” at 4, electronic copy available online at: 
http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/~/media/Files/inthenews/EP2TheRevisedEquatorPrinciplesWhyhardnosedb
ankersareembracingsoftlawprinciples.ashx. 
 
5
 See e.g., John M. Conley and Cynthia A. Williams, “Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?” 
(2011) 33 Law & Policy 542 [Conley and Williams] at 543 and 552. The authors argue that it is “possible 
that experience with the EPs is leading to real change—in some cases, rapid change—in the culture of 
banking organizations. In fact, it could be the case that the moral and ethical sensibilities of employees and 
managers are being more deeply engaged by the reflective processes the EPs demand.” 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight into these claims from the 
Canadian perspective by documenting EPs adoption by Canadian banks as an illustration 
of the practical effect of CSR in a particular context. This research will respond to calls 
for further study into a fundamental question posed in the academic literature: why do 
banks, as profit maximizing institutions, voluntarily agree to adopt and adhere to the 
EPs?
6
 This apparent contradiction between corporate goals and corporate practices is 
explored further with particular focus upon the interesting space the EPs occupy between 
self-interested business motivations and CSR.
7
 
At a higher level of abstraction, this thesis will also examine the role of the EPs as 
a mode of governance in regulating banking conduct. Along these lines, there is an 
emerging body of social science literature that considers the EPs in the context of 
theoretical questions about CSR, voluntary codes of conduct, regulation, and 
                                                 
6
 See e.g., Richard Macve and Xiaoli Chen, “The “equator principles”: a success for voluntary codes?” 
(2010) 23 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 890 [Macve and Chen] at 894-896. See also 
Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 547 (noting that the EPs provoke “many questions,” but pointing out 
that it is still early days in their study of this area: “[w]hy have so many banks signed onto the EPs, 
including banks that were not particularly exposed to the kinds of reputational risk that motivated some of 
the early adopters? What predictions can we make about which banks will be vigorous implementers and 
which will not? How will regional patterns of adoption affect the efficacy of the EPs as global regulation? 
What implications are there for theories of corporate governance if industry-wide lending standards have 
effects within individual corporations? And why do some banks appear to be adopting the spirit of the EPs 
at a deeper level than others?” However the authors note that scholars are “at the start of a broader 
investigation of these phenomena and have no definitive answers as yet. … Ultimately, we hope to be able 
to address the questions of why the market has worked here to promote at least some degree of 
responsibility, yet has failed in other banking contexts, and what we can learn from those differences.”).  
 
7
 See e.g., Olaf Weber, “Environmental Credit Risk Management in Banks and Financial Service 
Institutions” (2012) 21 Business Strategy and the Environment 248 [Weber] at 249. In the context of the 
interplay between profit motives and adoption of CSR principles in banking, Weber notes that the business 
of banks is to “accept deposits and channel the capital into lending or investment activities. They are 
intermediaries with an economic and channeling function.” As a result, Weber argues that banks are 
“primarily concerned about the financial return of their activities in relation to the risk that has to be taken. 
They often stress the trade-off between financial return and corporate sustainability rather than seeing a 
win-win situation.”  
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developments in corporate governance.
8
 More specifically, scholars use the EPs as a 
model to examine the voluntary action by banks as a form of corporate regulation. They 
argue that by “constructing a kind of “bottom up” framework, but leaving the decision on 
adoption as voluntary,” the EPs are an example of “soft law.”9 Similarly, scholars in this 
area argue that, by voluntarily choosing to adopt the EPs, member banks have become de 
facto “sustainability regulators,” acting in ways that can be characterized as both 
responsible and sustainable.
10
  
This research is needed and timely. There is no question that financial institutions 
occupy a tenuous space in the hearts and minds of most people and banks in particular are 
often thought of as profit hungry machines with little or no social conscience.
11
 The 
recent financial crisis brought many of these issues to a boiling point, as the sector 
generated significant public anger in response to the widely publicized and criticized 
government bailouts in international financial systems. In the aftermath of the crisis, and 
coupled with widely condemned compensation practices for financial executives, it is 
                                                 
8
 See e.g., Deborah E. Rupp and Cynthia A. Williams, “The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of 
Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum” (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 580 [Rupp and Williams] at 582-584; see also e.g., Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 545 and 553-
555. 
  
9
 See e.g., Macve and Chen, supra note 6 at 891. 
  
10
 Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 543. The authors note that “in one limited area of their operations, 
project finance, where global banks kept risk on their own balance sheets and were actually exposed to 
many types of risk usually dismissed as “externalities,” many joined an initiative whereby they agreed to 
act in ways that can be labeled both responsible and sustainable.” 
  
11
 See Christopher C. Nicholls, Financial Institutions - The Regulatory Framework (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) [Nicholls] at 1-3. Nicholls describes the tenuous nature of society’s 
relationship with banks, noting that “the bank, after all, is the quintessential financial ‘institution,’ standing 
at the center of the financial system in Canada and in most other industrialized countries. …” Despite the 
important role played by financial institutions in the economy and society, however, Nicholls points out 
that “engendering confidence does not necessarily engender affection. … Popular resentment of powerful 
institutions and the well-paid people who run them is neither a new phenomenon nor a surprising one, and 
the central role played by banks in our credit system has made them very powerful institutions indeed.” 
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possible that bankers may now be even more generally detested than lawyers, although it 
remains a tight race.
12
  
More recently, the financial sector has become a hot-bed of activity as 
governments, regulators and academics work to understand the causes of the financial 
crisis and to ensure the soundness of domestic and international banking systems.
13
 Some 
legal commentators and scholars have also started to consider the financial crisis in the 
context of CSR theory. Janda et al argue in their recent legal analysis of CSR, for 
example, that the “causes of the financial crises, in fact had much to do with the lack of 
sufficient progress in CSR.”14 Amongst the contributing factors to the financial crisis 
they identified were a lack of transparency and accountability; a lack of minimum 
standards and best practices; a lack of appropriate risk management; and a neglect of the 
duties that financial institutions owe to society and the financial system. In short, they 
argued, the financial crisis was caused in part at least by conduct that demonstrated the 
“opposite of sensible CSR principles.”15 
                                                 
12
 Ibid at 2. Nicholls notes that few professions (with the possible exception of the legal profession) have 
been “more vilified than banking in popular literature, films and television.” This leads to an obvious 
question: what might be said of banking lawyers? 
 
13
 A discussion of the causes of the financial crisis and the steps taken by international regulators in 
response is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for more information in this area, see the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s response to the financial crisis, available online: 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/fincriscomp.htm. The work in this area continues with respect to the “International 
regulatory framework for banks (Basel III),” see online at:  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm. 
  
14
 Michael Kerr, Richard Janda and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility - A Legal Analysis 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009) [Janda et al] at 590. However, this view is not universally 
held. Financial economists argue, for example, that the financial crisis was caused by structural problems in 
domestic and international banking systems that had very little to do with the decision by banks to adopt (or 
not) CSR. See e.g., Gary Gorton, “Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend Reader’s 
Guide (with A. Metrick)” (2012) 50 Journal of Economic Literature 128. Gorton states that the catalyst for 
the near collapse of the international banking system was a relatively familiar concept: a “banking panic” 
or “run on the bank.”   
 
15
 Ibid 
 
6 
 
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis ultimately concludes that examples of CSR 
behavior can now be observed as Canadian banks continue to define the scope of their 
involvement with the EPs.
16
 However, this conclusion is tempered by the finding that 
there is little doubt that pragmatic and self-interested business motivations are also 
behind EPs adoption and implementation by Canadian banks. Any expectations that we 
might one day arrive at “socially responsible” banks should therefore be tempered by the 
reality that CSR remains in a state of flux as a business and legal concept and has yet to 
gain universal implementation in Canadian banking. 
Interestingly, as will be discussed in this thesis, these findings are also consistent 
with broader themes identified in the scholarship in this area: the idea that adopting banks 
see the EPs as “good for business” in that they use the principles in their own self-interest 
to manage certain credit and reputational risks inherent in some of their lending activities. 
Moreover, given these self-interested motivations, some banks have been heavily 
criticized for lacking transparency and accountability in complying with the EPs’ 
requirements. Since no overt legal mechanism exists to monitor and enforce EPs 
compliance, concerns about “free-riding” have now emerged as critics point out that all 
adopters are likely to gain some reputational benefits irrespective of their actual 
compliance practices. 
As noted in this thesis, these criticisms demonstrate one of the key drawbacks of 
voluntary CSR initiatives like the EPs: they may lack the necessary compliance and 
enforcement measures to effectively promote and implement CSR. In particular, the 
instant research shows that these observations are directly relevant in the Canadian 
                                                 
16
 Conley and Williams used a similar backdrop for their paper on the EPs, noting that this “is an ironic 
time to be writing about banks as possible global sustainability regulators, …” See Conley and Williams, 
supra note 5 at 542.  
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context as it finds that Canadian banks are using the EPs primarily for their important 
reputational benefits. This thesis therefore concludes that Canadian banks need to do a 
better job of promoting the transparency of their EPs reporting and compliance practices 
in order to more fully implement the EPs, and to avoid being labeled with the free-rider 
problem referred to above. Given the importance of many of these issues and the 
significant power and influence of banks on the everyday lives of Canadians, this area of 
analysis should remain as an important item on academic, regulatory, political and social 
agendas. 
 
1.2 Introduction to CSR  
This thesis adopts a broad conception of CSR to mean the idea that “a corporation 
must act in a responsible manner with regard to the environment, community and broader 
society in which it operates.”17 This definition is chosen for its inclusiveness as this thesis 
acknowledges that CSR means different things to different people and does not enjoy a 
universally accepted definition.
18
 As discussed below, however, the lack of a unified 
definition of CSR does not mean that it cannot (or should not) be studied as a concept.
19
 
In this regard, the study of CSR necessarily reflects concerns about the proper conduct of 
                                                 
17
 This is the definition of CSR endorsed by the late Hon. Mr. Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier, formerly 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, in his forward to the text by Janda et al. See Janda et al, supra note 14.  
 
18
 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of some of the legal, economic and business 
theory related to CSR. The starting point for this analysis acknowledges that the academic relevance of 
CSR remains hotly debated and controversial and that the concept itself does not have a universally 
accepted definition. 
    
19
 The early development of CSR as a concept is said to have occurred primarily in business schools. 
However, CSR scholars claim that there has now been a resurgence of CSR, with its prominence widened 
to other disciplines, such as politics, economics, law and sociology. See e.g., Stephen Brammer, Gregory 
Jackson and Dirk Matten “Corporate Social Responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on 
private governance” (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review 3 [Brammer et al] at 7. 
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business enterprise and there can be little doubt that this area of concern has occupied 
philosophers, scholars, religious and political leaders and law-makers for centuries.
20
 
 
More recently, these issues were brought to the forefront in the corporate law 
context by the famous 1930s Harvard Law Review exchange between Professors Adolf 
A. Berle Jr. of Columbia Law School and Merrick Dodd Jr. of Harvard. Professor Berle 
espoused the idea that the primary duty of corporate directors is to use their powers only 
to further the interests of shareholders.
21
 Professor Dodd, on the other hand, argued that 
corporations should take into account the interests of other corporate stakeholders as well 
– those of employees, consumers and the general public.22 Although the Berle-Dodd 
exchange did not focus directly on CSR (the formal concept was not yet established), 
these fundamental questions continue to dominate the academic discussion and debate in 
this area.
23
 In this vein, CSR is also understood in this thesis to emphasize an approach to 
                                                 
20
 See the discussion on this point by Jennifer A. Zerk, “Multinationals and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law” (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
[Zerk] at 15.   
    
21
 Adolf A. Berle Jr., “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049 [Berle]. 
Berle’s thesis was that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to 
any group within a corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all 
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.” As Berle 
explained in later articles in the Columbia Law Review, his principal concern was that directors were not 
really qualified for the task of serving non-shareholder interests and, as he noted in the original paper, a 
multi-stakeholder model raises accountability issues. See ““Control” in Corporate Law” (1958) 58 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1212[Berle-Control], and “Modern Functions of the Corporate System” (1962) 62 Colum. L. Rev. 
433. 
 
22
 E. Merrick Dodd Jr., “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 
1145 [Dodd]. Dodd viewed as problematic the idea that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of 
making profits for their shareholders. He  advocated instead for a view of the “business corporation as an 
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function …”   
 
23
 See e.g., Archie B. Carroll and Kareem M. Shabana, “The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice” (2010) International Journal of Management 
Reviews 85 [Carroll and Shabana] at 86-87. The authors note that the roots of the formal concept of CSR 
emerged sometime after the Berle-Dodd exchange during the period 1945–1960. In particular, they 
reference Dean Donald K. David’s comments to the incoming MBA class at the Harvard Business School 
in 1946 wherein Dean David “exhorted the future business executives to take heed of the responsibilities 
that had come to rest on the shoulders of business leaders.”     
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corporate governance that “integrates and balances the self-interests of the corporation 
with the interests of the public” such that the “role of the corporation goes beyond 
providing individual benefits to its shareholders; it also includes a responsibility towards 
a wider community.”24 As discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the 
primary importance of earning economic returns from business activities is recognized 
under this model, with the idea being that corporations can also be asked to “do more.” 
From a legal perspective, for example, CSR is often understood to mean “doing more 
than what is required by law, i.e. beyond legal compliance.”25  
As will be shown in Chapter 2, however, any claim about the merits of CSR must 
be considered in light of the fact that CSR remains in a state of flux and is not universally 
accepted. This is particularly true in economics and corporate law circles where scholars 
                                                 
24
 This is the second part of the definition of CSR endorsed by Justice Gonthier in his forward to Janda et 
al. See Janda et al, supra note 14. 
  
25
 Karin Buhmann “Corporate Social Responsibility: what role for law? Some aspects for law and CSR” 
(2006) 6 Corporate Governance 188 at 189. As discussed in Section 2.2 of this thesis, however, there are 
difficulties associated with this “balancing” of profits with CSR approach. For example, it assumes that 
there is some knowable, objective “reasonable” amount of profitability that can be balanced against a 
corporation’s other social interests. Questions therefore arise regarding the point at which a particular 
business can be said to have achieved the base measure of profitability which then subjects it to the 
expectation that it should now “do more.”  
 
For a practical example of the idea that businesses should “do more” in the banking context, see the recent 
coverage of the statement by Royal Bank of Canada’s CEO Gord Nixon on his bank’s response to the 
temporary foreign workers controversy, available online at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/04/11/rbc-gord-nixon-apology-letter.html.   
 
“The recent debate about an outsourcing arrangement for some technology services has 
raised important questions. 
 
While we are compliant with the regulations, the debate has been about something else. 
The question for many people is not about doing only what the rules require - it’s about 
doing what employees, clients, shareholders and Canadians expect of RBC. And that’s 
something we take very much to heart. 
… 
 
[w]e are reviewing our supplier arrangements and policies with a continued focus on 
Canadian jobs and prosperity, balancing our desire to be both a successful business and a 
leading corporate citizen.” 
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continue to be heavily critical of CSR because it does not correspond with their views of 
the role of business in society. As will be discussed, CSR is largely irrelevant (and 
possibly even harmful) under these positions because the only social obligation of 
business is to contribute to the wealth of society.
26
  
The purpose of this thesis is not, however, to support or reject the classical 
economic or corporate law views as they relate to CSR. Rather, as noted above, this 
thesis proceeds on the basis that CSR values
27
 may now be observed in modern corporate 
practice, and argues that the EPs offer a workable practical model for study in the 
banking context because they not only demonstrate CSR but also are good for business.
28
 
As a result, this research argues that the EPs offer a practical example of the “business 
case” approach to CSR discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.29 As will be discussed, 
                                                 
26
 See Section 2.2(a) of this thesis for a discussion of the classical economic and corporate law views. 
  
27
 A discussion of the normative underpinnings for CSR is beyond the scope this thesis. However, the 
reference to CSR “values” here is to the general idea that businesses have a responsibility “to do what is 
right, just, and fair, and to avoid or minimize harm to stakeholders (employees, consumers, the 
environment, and others).” See Archie B. Carroll, “The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders” (1991) 34 Business Horizons 39 [Carroll-
Pyramid] at 42.   
 
28
 This pragmatic approach to the analysis in this area is adopted by some business lawyers. See e.g., the 
2005 study “Banking on Responsibility” by U.K. law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP 
[Freshfields] at 42. Freshfields notes that “it is important not to see making profits and protecting society as 
well as the environment as diametrically opposed. Progress can be made by agreeing on how to balance the 
need to generate profits against the need to protect the environment and society.” A copy of this study is 
available online at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/manage/ems_files/download/banking_on_responsibility/050701_banking_on_res
ponsibility.pdf. Semotiuk adopted a similar approach for her LLM thesis on the role of corporate law in 
CSR. See Orysia Semotiuk, “The role of law in corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory” 
Queen’s University (2004) ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis [Semotiuk] at 1-2.  
 
29
 As discussed in Chapter 2, however, it is important to point out that the business case approach is not 
universally accepted and significant debate continues on whether CSR in this form fits into other theories 
of the firm. The classical economic view, for example, may continue to reject CSR in principle and doubt 
the value-creating contribution of CSR activities. See Section 2.3 of this thesis for further discussion on this 
point. 
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the focus of the business case approach is on the argument that CSR can be integrated 
with financial management to create sustainable companies in the long-run.
30
   
 
1.3 Thesis Organization and Methodology  
This thesis is divided into 7 Chapters and utilizes multiple lines of doctrinal 
resources and extrinsic evidence, including bank public disclosures, law firm articles and 
various domestic and international research reports relevant to the banking industry. The 
remainder of this Chapter 1 provides a brief description of Canadian Schedule 1 banks as 
the population under study and then sets out some of the limitations of the methodology 
used.  
Chapter 2 provides a brief update on developments in CSR theory and the primary 
research method is doctrinal. The intention is not to cover the extensive body of CSR 
related scholarship but, rather, to provide a briefing on developments in this area that are 
most relevant to the instant research. Some of the conceptual challenges advanced against 
CSR will be briefly discussed; however, the purpose of Chapter 2 is ultimately to show 
that the lack of a unified understanding of CSR does not mean that it cannot be studied as 
a legitimate academic concept. In particular, recent scholarship has identified common 
themes or approaches to CSR, including the “instrumentalist” approach that is most 
relevant to the instant research. This, in turn, leads into a discussion of the “business 
case” for CSR and other related theories including the “enlightened self-interest” and 
“enlightened shareholder” theories.  Finally, Chapter 2 reviews recent commentary to 
make the argument that CSR is often misunderstood as a concept because of changes in 
                                                 
30
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the so-called “voluntary” versus “mandatory” (e.g. imposed by law or regulation) 
corporate conduct debate. As will be shown, this distinction is no longer as important as 
once thought as CSR activity is now understood to exist in a wide range of both voluntary 
and mandatory corporate behavior.   
Moving away from the ongoing academic debate surrounding CSR, Chapter 3 
makes the case for the practical relevance of CSR in Canada generally and in the 
Canadian financial services industry specifically. The purpose is to set the stage for the 
remainder of this thesis by arguing that, the lack of a universally accepted theoretical 
model notwithstanding, the emergence of CSR is now a phenomenon that can be 
observed in practice in Canada. The methodology here includes a review of examples of 
CSR in the Canadian context to show that CSR has gained a strong foothold in practice in 
this country. Doctrinal sources are also considered to show that general CSR principles 
can now be connected to developments in the Canadian financial sector. As noted above, 
the financial sector is viewed as increasingly relevant to CSR and some commentators 
claim that a shift is occurring toward greater importance being placed on social and 
environmental values in this industry. However, despite these developments and early 
“wins” for CSR, Chapter 3 concludes that significant work remains to be done to advance 
CSR in Canada and, in particular, the Canadian financial sector. 
Chapter 4 begins the thesis’s case study by introducing the EPs. As noted above, 
the EPs were chosen for study because they represent a potential example of CSR in 
practice: a series of voluntary guidelines that banks have committed to follow in 
managing the social and environmental risks of their project financing activities. A brief 
overview of the EPs is provided, along with a description of the requirements they 
13 
 
 
currently prescribe for member banks generally. Chapter 4 also discusses some of the 
events that occurred on the international project financing stage leading up to the 
development of the EPs in 2003. These developments are interesting because they show 
that reputation risk management was a strong motivating factor behind the development 
of the EPs in the aftermath of significant public relations scandals for member banks. In 
particular, the fallout from the private sector financing of the Three Gorges Dam Project 
in the People’s Republic of China is discussed.   
Chapter 5 provides a literature review of the EPs related scholarship that has 
emerged to-date. It considers a fundamental question posed in the academic work in this 
area: why did banks and other profit maximizing financial institutions voluntarily 
develop and adopt a code like the EPs? A review of several papers that have addressed 
this apparent contradiction shows that scholars agree that pragmatic motivations are 
behind EPs adoption as member banks see them as good for business. The second part of 
Chapter 5 provides a review of the theoretical CSR framework developed for the EPs. As 
noted above, it is generally well accepted in this scholarship that the principles amount to 
a voluntary code, thereby evidencing an example of the form of global regulation known 
as “soft law.”  Finally, Chapter 5 canvasses some of the concerns associated with the EPs 
compliance practices of member banks and the so-called “free-rider” problem that has 
emerged in this context. 
Chapter 6 considers the practical relevance of the EPs in Canadian banking and 
the methodology shifts to a market based analysis of the EPs related public disclosure of 
key Canadian banks. The emerging role of the EPs in Canada is assessed, along with a 
consideration of how far (if at all) the EPs have become embedded in the Canadian 
14 
 
 
banking industry. This methodology is adopted from a recent study by Macve and Chen 
of EPs disclosures by banks in the U.K.
31
 The authors note in their paper that the EPs 
provide an interesting arena in which to analyze how banks are implementing CSR but 
pointed out that there remains a need for further research to investigate actual bank 
practices and how this varies over time.
32
 The instant research will respond to this call for 
further study from the Canadian perspective by considering the following questions: 
1. What are the motivations for adopting and adhering to the EPs in Canada? 
2. Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible? 
3. How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking? 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 7 sets out some of the general observations that can be 
made on the basis of this research and the case study on the adoption of the EPs in 
Canada. As a first point, Chapter 7 concludes that the results of this study provide support 
for the proposition that Canadian banks are demonstrating CSR behavior through the 
steps they are taking to implement and comply with the EPs: each of the Canadian banks 
studied has made broad public statements concerning the importance of CSR and point to 
their adoption of the EPs as evidence of their commitment in this regard. As a result, 
there can be little doubt that a practical shift of business and financial values is occurring 
leading toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the 
Canadian banking sector.   
However, this conclusion is ultimately tempered by the finding that Canadian 
banks are using the EPs primarily for self-interested reasons. As discussed in this thesis, 
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 Macve and Chen, supra note 6. 
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 Ibid at 894-896. 
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this is not necessarily inconsistent with CSR to the extent that the business case for CSR 
contemplates self-interested business motivations as being a primary driver of corporate 
activity.
33
 However, the business case for CSR also requires that consideration be given 
to environmental and social concerns and this study found no evidence of positive 
environmental or social outcomes in the EPs reporting of Canadian banks. In fact, this 
study found that the limited EPs reporting and disclosure by Canadian banks makes it 
impossible to draw any conclusions in this area. As a result, this thesis concludes that 
there is clearly room for improvement for Canadian banks, particularly in the areas of 
EPs disclosure and compliance practices, and further study will be needed to see if 
Canadian banks are mindful of these concerns as they move forward in their 
implementation of the principles. 
Moreover, Chapter 7 concludes that while the case study conducted here shows 
that the emergence of CSR behavior can be observed in Canadian banking, it also shows 
that many of the theoretical problems associated with CSR emerge when it is put into 
practice in this industry. As result, significant work remains to be done to advance CSR 
in financial services and even more work will be needed to see if it works in practice in 
the Canadian banking sector. Beyond Canada, Chapter 7 also identifies that further study 
is needed into the impact of the EPs on the international banking industry. For example, 
as geopolitical shifts are taking place, it will become increasingly important to understand 
the extent to which banks from emerging market economies are adopting the EPs.  
Finally, Chapter 7 identifies that there will be significant opportunity for further 
study in this area when the on-going EPs update process is implemented in 2013 and 
2014. A draft of the new principles was released for stakeholder consultation and public 
                                                 
33
 See Section 2.3 of this thesis for a discussion of the business case approach to CSR.  
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comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal comment period closed on October 12, 
2012. The updated principles were formally launched and are effective from June 4, 
2013, but there is a transition period in place to allow banks to continue using the current 
version of the EPs until the end of 2013. Although banks have made a number of 
commitments to make improvements during the update process, some commentators and 
NGOs are highly critical of the efforts taken in this regard to date. BankTrack in 
particular has indicated its frustration on these issues and has demanded firm 
commitments from the banks; failing which, it argues the updated principles will have 
failed to achieve any meaningful improvements.
34
  
 
1.4 Population under Study: Schedule 1 Canadian Banks 
All banks operating in Canada are subject to the regulation and supervision of the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).
35
 According to the 
Canadian Bankers Association, the banking industry in Canada currently includes “24 
domestic banks, 25 foreign bank subsidiaries, 24 full-service foreign bank branches and 
                                                 
34
 See online at: http://www.banktrack.org/show/pages/about_banktrack. BankTrack is a global umbrella 
network of NGOs and individuals tracking the operations of the private financial sector (listed as including 
commercial banks, investors, insurance companies and pension funds). BankTrack’s submissions to the 
EPs Association are contained in its paper, “The Outside Job, Turning the Equator Principles towards 
people and planet” (October 2011) [Outside Job], available online at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/download/the_outside_job/111021_the_outside_job_final.pdf. BankTrack argues 
that the updating process has had “serious flaws” and that, if continued in their current mode, the EPs “risk 
to become an inward looking initiative, largely irrelevant to outside stakeholders and thus will contribute 
little to restoring the trust lost in the sector” (Outside Job at 3).  
 
35
 See OSFI’s website, online at: http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=3. 
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five foreign bank lending branches operating in Canada.”36 The CBA provides the 
following information relating to the breakdown of banks in Canada: 
 Schedule I Banks are Canadian banks and are authorized by OSFI under the 
Bank Act
37
 to accept deposits, which may be eligible for deposit insurance 
provided by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
 Schedule II banks are foreign bank subsidiaries authorized to accept deposits, 
which may be eligible for deposit insurance; 
 Schedule III banks are bank branches of foreign institutions that are 
authorized to do some specific form of banking business in Canada. Certain 
restrictions are placed on their activities (e.g. they may not be eligible to take 
deposits); and  
 Most Schedule II and Schedule III banks specialize in certain niche financing 
sectors and have only one or two offices or branches located within Canada.
38
 
The focus of this thesis is on Schedule 1 banks as representing the largest portion 
of the Canadian financial banking industry. More specifically, this thesis focuses on 
Canada’s five largest domestic banks (referred to in this thesis as the “Big-5” Canadian 
banks): Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of 
Montreal and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Together, the Big-5 Canadian 
banks are taken as representative of the Canadian banking industry for the purposes of 
this thesis as they hold over 80 percent of total banking assets in Canada: OSFI confirms 
                                                 
36
 See the website of the Canadian Banker’s Association [CBA], online at: 
http://www.cba.ca/en/component/content/category/61-banks-operating-in-canada (accessed as of June 28, 
2013). 
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 Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46 [the Bank Act]. 
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this relative importance of the Big-5 Canadian banks in the following graph:
39
 
 
 
1.5 Research Limitations 
The following limitations in the methodology have been identified for this thesis, 
each of which could form the opportunity for further study in this area. First, this research 
presupposes that the emergence of CSR in banking is something that can be observed. 
However, as will be noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there is no definitive agreement in 
the academic literature on what constitutes CSR and whether or not observed corporate 
conduct falls into a conception of what is socially responsible depends on the context and 
is open to interpretation. It is therefore difficult to measure in any meaningful sense. As 
noted above, however, it is relatively early days in the study of the implications of CSR 
                                                 
39
 See the Canadian banking industry information contained in the March 26, 2013 letter to the banking 
industry from Mark Zelmer, Assistant Superintendent Regulation Sector of OSFI, regarding Domestic 
Systemic Importance and Capital Targets – DTIs, at 3. Electronic copy available online at: http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/DSIB_let_e.pdf. The OSFI Advisory 
relating to Domestic Systemic Importance and Capital Targets – DTIs is also available online at: 
http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/DSIB_adv_e.pdf.   
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for the banking industry
40
 and the purpose here is only to use a broadly defined 
understanding of CSR to document the emergence of a range of activities in Canadian 
banking that appear to be socially responsible. The goal is to support further theoretical 
and practical research into a model of CSR that is relevant to the banking sector and 
further research will be needed to measure whether and how banks are being socially 
responsible in any quantifiable way.  
A second and related limitation is that this research also presupposes that the 
emergence of social type duties in the banking sector can be attributed to CSR. In this 
regard, however, since there is no agreed upon definition of CSR, it is difficult to state 
with certainty that any of the behaviors discussed in this thesis are directly caused by the 
promulgation of CSR principles. Some of the implications of this are discussed in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 where it is noted that banks are likely incentivized to adopt the EPs 
by competitive pressures and self-interested motivations rather than strict adherence to 
CSR. However, as noted above, the overall purpose of this thesis is simply to make an 
initial connection between CSR and observed practices in the Canadian banking sector; 
further study will be needed to determine the strength of the connection, or whether there 
may be other causal factors at play.  
This thesis is also limited to a discussion of CSR and does not purport to cover the 
entire range of corporate conduct models developed in the areas of law and business, as 
well as other disciplines, such as, politics, economics, sociology and philosophy. This 
approach is justifiable given that it is consistent with statements by scholars who confirm 
that CSR remains the “dominant, if not exclusive, term in the academic literature and 
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 See e.g., Conley and Williams, supra note 5. 
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business practice.”41 However, further study would be needed to determine if and how 
the results of this thesis might support other theories in this area. For example, this 
research might also align with stakeholder theory, which is understood to be closely 
related to CSR. A full discussion of stakeholder theory is beyond the scope of this thesis 
but, generally speaking, it holds that corporations should take into account the 
considerations of other persons that impact or may be impacted by corporate actions.
42
 
Finally, this thesis is obviously limited in terms of its geographic application to 
Canada. Further, the population under study is again limited to the Big-5 Canadian banks 
listed under Schedule 1 of the Bank Act. Although this is justifiable given the weighting 
of the Big-5 Canadian banks in Canada’s banking sector (see Section 1.4 above), the 
research will be limited in that it may not consider emerging issues in other areas of the 
Canadian and international financial industries. As discussed in Chapter 7, further 
research will be needed to see whether some of the findings of this thesis can be applied 
more generally across the larger body of what we consider to be financial institutions in 
Canada and internationally.  
                                                 
41
 Carroll and Shabana, supra note 23 at 86. The authors point out that the “term ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ is still in popular use, even though competing, complementary and overlapping concepts 
such as corporate citizenship, business ethics, stakeholder management and sustainability are all vying to 
become the most accepted and widespread descriptor of the field. At the same time, the concept of 
corporate social performance (CSP) has become an established umbrella term which embraces both the 
descriptive and normative aspects of the field, as well as placing an emphasis on all that firms are achieving 
or accomplishing in the realm of social responsibility policies, practices and results. In the final analysis, 
however, all these concepts are related, in that they are integrated by key, underlying themes such as value, 
balance and accountability, and CSR remains a dominant, if not exclusive, term in the academic literature 
and in business practice.”  
 
42
 See e.g., Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, “The stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: 
Concepts, evidence and implications” (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 65.  
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CHAPTER 2 – UPDATE ON CSR  
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a brief update on recent CSR related scholarship. The body 
of work that makes up the academic literature on CSR is extensive and a full review is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this Chapter focuses on CSR developments that 
are relevant to the instant research and, in particular, the recent legal scholarship in this 
area advanced by Janda et al in Corporate Social Responsibility - A Legal Analysis.
43
  
 The remainder of this Chapter is divided into 3 parts. Section 2.2 provides a 
discussion of some of the conceptual challenges that have contributed to the lack of a 
formal unified definition of CSR. In particular, the criticisms of CSR advanced on the 
basis of the classical economic view and corporate law are discussed.  
Section 2.3 then turns the analysis to a potential middle ground in the CSR debate 
- the “business case” for CSR - that has been developed at least partly in response to the 
challenges advanced by scholars espousing the classical economic view. As will be 
discussed, this thesis argues that the EPs offer a chance to study the business case 
approach because the principles evidence CSR values and are also good for business. 
Finally, Section 2.4 makes the argument that CSR is also often misunderstood as 
a concept because of changes to the so-called “voluntary” versus “mandatory” (e.g. 
imposed by law or regulation) corporate conduct debate. As will be shown, this issue is 
no longer as important as once thought as CSR activity is now believed to exist within a 
range of both voluntary and mandatory corporate behavior.   
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 Janda et al, supra note 14. For a review of this text, see Sara Seck “Review of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Legal Analysis by Michael Kerr, Richard Janda and Chip Pitts” (2010) 49 C.B.L.J. 335.       
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2.2 Update on CSR Theory 
(a) Conceptual Challenges  
This analysis starts from the position that there is no universally accepted 
definition of CSR.
44
 In a general sense, it is probably accurate today to say that the 
concept of CSR clearly “means something” but, as will be shown below, it does “not 
always mean the same thing to everybody.”45 This is confirmed by Janda et al in the legal 
context as the authors conclude that there is no single “legal definition” of CSR.46 
However, although CSR is often criticized on this point as being theoretically 
problematic, Janda et al argue that the absence of a definition is, in fact, purposeful: CSR 
needs to remain “conceptually flexible in order to foster on-going evolution and 
development” and any legal understanding must therefore be directed at a moving 
target.
47
 They point out that what is socially responsible in any given context depends on 
changing social needs and concerns, and these cannot be confined to current standards. 
As a result, CSR is necessarily a dynamic concept that remains “in a constant state of 
evolution and, arguably, should never be subject to a fixed, universal definition.”48  
                                                 
44
 See e.g., the discussion on this point by Carroll and Shabana. Carroll and Shabana, supra note 23 at 86.  
 
45
 Dow Votaw’s comments from 1972 still ring true today. See Dow Votaw “Genius Became Rare: A 
Comment on the Doctrine of Social Responsibility Pt 1’” (1972) 15 California Management Review 25 at 
25. Votaw wrote that the term corporate social responsibility “means something, but not always the same 
thing to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; to others, it means 
socially responsible behavior in the ethical sense; to still others, the meaning transmitted is that of 
‘responsible for’ in a causal mode; many simply equate it with a charitable contribution; some take it to 
mean socially conscious; many of those who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for 
legitimacy in the context of belonging or being proper or valid; a few see a sort of fiduciary duty imposing 
higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on citizens at large.’’ 
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As noted in the introduction to this thesis, one of the main conceptual difficulties 
in defining and understanding CSR arises in the literature because of disagreement over 
the nature of the corporation and its role in society. In this regard, it can be argued that 
the typical focal point of the CSR debate is the “inquiry into what obligations 
corporations owe to society” and this can be thought of as a debate about the nature or 
purpose of the corporation or, stated another way, “any view of CSR conceals complex 
normative conclusions about the nature of the corporation.”49 
In this regard, a detailed discussion about the highly complex nature of CSR and 
its controversial underpinnings is beyond the scope of this thesis.
 
In a very general sense, 
however, the scholarship identifies two different but related theoretical models for CSR: 
“rights approaches and power models.”50 Rights approaches typically center on 
arguments that corporations and society engage in a form of “social contract,” also 
referred to as a “social compact.”51 CSR scholars point out, for example, that the 
corporation has “always been a political creation” in that “the state granted the 
                                                 
49
 See Semotiuk, supra note 28 at 10 and 18. See also the reference to the Berle-Dodd exchange in Section 
1.2 of this thesis. 
 
50
 See Adaeze Okoye “Theorizing Corporate Social Responsibility as an Essentially Contested Concept: Is 
a Definition Necessary?” (2009) 89 Journal of Business Ethics 613 [Okoye] at 614-615 (describing 
attempts to analyze the complex theoretical underpinnings for CSR and noting that questions regarding the 
relationship between corporations and society have generally been analyzed in the “two-fold vein; that of 
rights approaches and power models.”) 
 
51
See Section 3.2 of this thesis for a discussion of the social contract approach in relation to Canadian banks 
specifically. Banks are corporations, but a special kind such that the social contract made with banks is 
likely different and more comprehensive. There is also a more extensive legislative context imposed on 
banks giving them the legal right to operate as financial intermediaries in our economic system. See e.g., 
Nicholls, supra note 11. The social contract approach in the general sense is normally associated with 
Thomas Donaldson; see e.g., Thomas Donaldson “Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory” (1994) 19 Academy of Management Review 252. 
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corporation the benefit of limited liability in order to facilitate the accumulation of 
capital.”52 As a result, Brammer et al argue on this point that  
“[t]his extension of limited liability created a fundamental issue of 
corporate governance. But it is not simply a matter of how managers are to 
be made accountable to the more diffuse group of shareholders as agency 
theory tells us, but a more fundamental issue of what responsibilities 
society places on the corporation itself in exchange for the legal privilege 
of limited liability.”53  
 
Similarly, as a starting point, for their discussion, Janda et al point out that the 
social contract or compact conception of CSR holds that in 
 “exchange for public trust and the social license to operate its business, 
the corporation makes a series of social business commitments or 
reciprocal undertakings. According to this understanding, the corporation 
cannot exist without its social setting and therefore makes undertakings to 
preserve and enhance the very social setting that has made its existence 
possible.”54  
 
Other prominent Canadian authors have commented positively on this social 
contract theory as well. For example, Hutchinson refers to a “democratic wager” being 
made:   
“[i]f particular individuals wish to avail themselves of the many benefits 
of incorporation (the most important of which is limited liability), it seems 
entirely fair and appropriate that they assume a reciprocal series of public 
responsibilities and forgo their almost unlimited control over the 
corporation’s organization and operations… .”55  
 
In addition to rights approaches, scholars argue that there are at least four power 
models in this area, including the power-responsibility model; the bureaucratic 
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 Brammer et al, supra note 19 at 6. 
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 Janda et al, supra note 14 at 17. 
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 Allan C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep - Corporate Governance for a Democratic Society 
(Toronto, ON: Irwin Law Inc., 2005) [Hutchinson] at 9.  
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responsibility model; the mutual interest model and the power-legitimacy model.
56
 
Generally speaking, power issues become relevant here to the extent that “[p]ower over 
the lives of others tends to create on the part of those most worthy to exercise it a sense of 
responsibility.”57 For example, under the power-legitimacy model, concerns about a 
corporation’s power legitimacy arise in the context of “examining questions of the 
legitimacy of corporate power within modern society; both in the sense of power being 
exercised legitimately and in the sense, of having legitimacy for the exercise of such 
power.”58 
However, economists and corporate law scholars typically reject the rights and 
power model approaches to argue that CSR is largely irrelevant (and possibly even 
harmful) to the extent that it is inconsistent with their own views on the role of business 
in society.
59
 The classical economic view holds, for example, that corporations contribute 
to the wealth and well-being of society by earning a profit and, as a result, the pursuit of 
economic goals becomes the only corporate social responsibility of business. This was 
perhaps most famously stated by Milton Friedman in his 1970 article in the New York 
Times wherein he argued that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business-
-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it 
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stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud.”60  
From this economic perspective, it can be argued that the common good of 
society will be furthered by “the self-interested actions of individual economic agents in a 
market economy, including in particular the actions of business enterprises guided by the 
profit motive ... .”61 As a result, under this view, economists see “profitability as a prima 
facie indicator of changes in general welfare: this is their starting point.”62 CSR could in 
fact be dangerous to the extent that the actions of companies are taken beyond profit 
motives, thereby worsening economic performance and making society and people in 
general worse off.
63
 
Traditional corporate law theory gives a similar but less clear cut conclusion. It 
holds that corporate directors have a duty to act in accordance with the best interests of 
                                                 
60
 See Milton Friedman, “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” New York Times 
Magazine, September 13, 1970.  
 
61
 David Henderson, Misguided Virtue, False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility, IEA Hobart 
Paper No. 142 (The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2001) [Henderson] at 20. However, CSR 
scholars question whether profitability should be used as the only guide for business given differences 
between short-term and long-term assessments of profit. As noted below in Section 2.3 of this thesis, one of 
the true complexities of CSR is that disregarding social and environmental issues may very well be 
profitable in the short term. In the long-term, however, CSR may improve a company’s overall value and 
even its profitability. Another complexity arises here surrounding whether profit maximization should be 
used as a guide, particularly since profit is an accounting construction that is open to interpretation; see e.g., 
Carroll-Pyramid, supra note 27 at 39-41. Carroll recognized that what he referred to as business’s 
“economic responsibility” was paramount and that “[a]ll other business responsibilities are predicated upon 
the economic responsibility of the firm, because without it others become moot considerations.” However, 
Carroll questioned the classical economic insistence on profit maximization, arguing that the profit 
principle was originally set in terms of “acceptable profits” until Friedman and others adopting the classical 
economic view turned it into the principle of “profit maximization.” 
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the shareholders of the corporation.
64 
To the extent that shareholders wish the corporation 
to “make as much money as possible,” it can be argued that corporate law facilitates 
wealth creation when corporations pursue economic returns for their shareholders within 
the rules imposed by law.
65
 Former Chancellor William T. Allen put it this way:  
“[s]tated broadly, but I think accurately, the elemental purpose of 
corporate law is the facilitation of cooperative activity that produces 
wealth. A net increase in total wealth, other things remaining unchanged, 
is an absolute good. With increased wealth, all other things remaining the 
same, there is a great ability to relieve human suffering and enhance 
life.”66 
 
As a result, scholars in this area argue that conclusions about CSR are the same 
under both classical economics and traditional corporate law:  
“Since both give pre-eminence to shareholders, they are cool towards the 
idea, now widely accepted, that power or status should be conferred, 
whether by law or corporate decisions, on other ‘stakeholders’ in a 
business. Both believe that companies will best discharge the 
responsibilities which specifically belong to them by taking profitability as 
                                                 
64
 In Canada, corporate law statutes mandate that the directors’ (and officers’) duty is to the corporation, 
not directly to the shareholders. The unresolved issue that remains, however, is how directors and officers 
are to operationalize this duty. The traditional view was that directors and officers were to act in the best 
interests of the “company” (meaning the company of shareholders, collectively). However, recent 
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considered. See e.g., the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 
[2008] 3 S.C.R. and Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461. For a 
discussion of these cases, see Ed Waitzer and Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate 
“Citizen”” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 444. The authors note at 441 that “one of the great 
unresolved debates in corporate law” remains “whether the interests of the corporation are limited to those 
of its shareholders, or whether they extend to the stakeholder constituencies that contribute to, or are 
impacted by, the corporate enterprise.” 
 
65
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merely be suggested. The “control” undoubtedly is still interested, as a rule, in maximizing profit. But it 
may be a secondary interest.” See Berle-Control, supra note 21 at 1214.  
   
66
 Chancellor T. Allen, “Ambiguity in Corporation Law” (1997) 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 895 at 895-896. Allen 
was Chancellor of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  
 
28 
 
 
a guide, subject always to acting within the law, and that they should not 
go out of their way to define and promote wider self-chosen objectives.”67     
 
(b) CSR as a Concept 
Due in part at least to the theoretical differences described above, we are left with 
CSR today as what can only be described as an ill-defined and often misunderstood 
concept.
68
 In fact, CSR continues to be criticized on this point as being unrealistic and 
lacking in academic legitimacy.
69
 However, these criticisms often represent an 
oversimplified understanding of CSR and ignore the fact that scholars from several 
disciplines have devoted significant effort toward the development of CSR into a 
workable theoretical concept.
70
 
Further, significant scholarly work in this area continues as efforts today focus on 
key features of CSR that can be readily identified and understood.
71
 Scholars point out, 
for example, that the field of CSR has “grown significantly and today contains a great 
proliferation of theories, approaches and terminologies.”72 More specifically, in their 
recent attempt to “map” this proliferation of CSR in the academic literature, Garriga and 
Mele point out that “the most relevant CSR theories and related approaches are focused 
on one of the following aspects of social reality: economics, politics, social integration 
                                                 
67
 See Henderson, supra note 61 at 20-21. 
 
68
 Okoye, supra note 50 at 614-615. 
 
69
 Semotiuk, supra note 28 at 19. Semotiuk notes that CSR is perceived as a rather naïve position by its 
critics: “a well-intentioned (yet unrealistic) plea to corporations by left-of-center political types hoping to 
do “good” in the world.”   
 
70
 See e.g., the description of the renewal of academic interest in CSR by Brammer et al, supra note 19 at 7. 
   
71
 Ibid 
 
72
 Elisabet Garriga and Dome`nec Mele, “Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the 
Territory” (2004) 53 Journal of Business Ethics 51 at 51.   
  
29 
 
 
and ethics.”73 Based on this work, Garriga and Mele conclude that most current CSR 
theories are focused on the following four key aspects:
 
 
1. instrumental in the sense of creating long-term value for 
companies,  
 
2. political in the sense of using business power responsibly,  
 
3. integrative in the sense of integrating business and social 
demands, and  
 
4. contributive in the sense of creating value for society by 
doing what is ethically correct.
74
 
 
This thesis aligns with the “instrumentalist” approach in that it argues that the EPs 
represent a potential example of the merger of CSR values with the economic reality of 
firms. In this regard, Archie B. Carroll is credited with having developed a multi-layer 
conception or “pyramid” model of CSR that consists of four interrelated aspects: a 
corporation’s economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities.75 Importantly, 
Carroll recognized that the economic responsibility to “provide goods and services” to 
society was paramount because all “other business responsibilities are predicated upon 
the economic responsibility of the firm, because without it the others become moot 
considerations.”76 Based on this, Carroll articulated a pyramid of CSR that contains the 
four components he identified:  
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“[b]eginning with the basic building block notion that 
economic performance undergirds all else. At the same 
time, business is expected to obey the law because the law 
is society's codification of acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior. Next is business’s responsibility to be ethical. At 
its most fundamental level, this is the obligation to do what 
is right, just, and fair, and to avoid or minimize harm to 
stakeholders (employees, consumers, the environment, and 
others). Finally, business is expected to be a good corporate 
citizen. This is captured in the philanthropic responsibility, 
wherein business is expected to contribute financial and 
human resources to the community and to improve the 
quality of life.”77  
 
Stated in more pragmatic terms, Carroll argued that “the CSR firm should strive 
to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen.”78 However, 
Carroll recognized that this model was imperfect and subject to criticism on the basis that 
there are inherent “tensions” between a corporation’s responsibilities. Carroll conceded 
that the most critical tensions would be between the economic and legal, economic and 
ethical, and economic and philanthropic responsibilities, and that the economic 
traditionalist might see this as a conflict between a firm’s “concern for profits” versus its 
“concern for society.” Carroll suggested, however, that this objection amounted to an 
oversimplification because a CSR perspective “would recognize these tensions as 
organizational realities, but focus on the total pyramid as a unified whole and how the 
firm might engage in decisions, actions, and programs that simultaneously fulfill all its 
component parts.”79 
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2.3 The Business Case for CSR  
Today, the economic rationale for CSR is often discussed in terms of the 
“business case” for CSR.80 Janda et al point out, for example, that a common theme is 
one of “integration of economic considerations, as the traditional focus of business, with 
environmental and social imperatives.”81 In short, this school of thought holds that 
“companies need to be ‘socially responsible’ to fulfill their obligations to shareholders.”82 
Stated more broadly, the business case for CSR “refers to the arguments or rationales 
supporting or documenting why the business community should accept and advance the 
CSR ‘cause’” and the primary question becomes “[w]hat do the business community and 
organizations get out of CSR; that is, how do they benefit tangibly from engaging in CSR 
policies, activities and practices?”83  
However, it is important to point out that the business case approach is not 
universally accepted and significant debate continues on whether CSR in this form fits 
into economic theory.
84
 Moreover, on the issue of firm profitability, it is important to 
note that, despite significant and on-going academic work, the practical connection 
between CSR and short-term financial performance has not been fully established. As a 
result, commentators conclude that continued work in this area is needed as academics 
remain skeptical and some find that “the theoretical arguments as well as the empirical 
evidence so far are rather poor. Financial performance is only weakly linked to corporate 
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socially responsible behavior; many papers even find a negative relationship between the 
two.”85  
On the other hand, CSR scholars point out that the focus of the business case for 
CSR is on long-term rather than short-term performance. Carroll and Shabana argue, for 
example, that this version of CSR may not be inconsistent with the classical economic 
view to the extent that: 
“[t]he notion of an economic responsibility in terms of financial profit to 
stockholders is accepted and required by both views. One may even argue 
that maximizing shareholder wealth in the long run is an underlying 
principle of both views. The real difference may be that the classical 
economic view fails to appreciate the long-term negative effects of the 
application of the maximization principle in the short term. In contrast, the 
opposite view applies the maximization principle for long-term benefits, 
which entails that such principle may be suppressed in certain short-term 
considerations.”86 
 
It can be argued generally in this context that one of the “main drivers” of the 
business case for CSR arises because companies may already be aware that there are 
long-term gains to be made by adhering to CSR.
87
 For example, Carroll and Shabana 
have now identified that the business case is understood to include four different sub-
groupings based on the “value creation focus” of the approach:  
1. cost and risk reduction;  
2. gaining competitive advantage;  
3. developing reputation and legitimacy; and  
                                                 
85
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4. seeking win–win outcomes through synergistic value creation.88 
 
Based on these developments, scholars note that the business case for CSR should 
be more palatable to classical economists and corporate law scholars because of the way 
that it fuses “economic and moral considerations” in a “utilitarian rather than an idealistic 
or altruistic discourse.”89 For example, Macve and Chen argue in this context that the 
business case does not per se conflict with a primary objective of serving shareholders, as 
required under traditional corporate law models.
90
 Similarly, Okoye points out that the 
business case is “not inconsistent” with the theories of the firm to the extent that “certain 
social activities may contribute to the long-term shareholder value of the corporation.”91  
In any event, CSR scholars argue that the business case approach ultimately helps 
to frame the debate as it emerged in response to Milton Friedman and the classical 
economist view that businesses must focus only on maximizing profits. On this point 
Carroll and Shabana state that “[i]f it could be demonstrated that businesses actually 
benefited financially from CSR, then possibly Friedman’s arguments would somewhat be 
neutralized.” 92 Moreover, it can be argued from a practical perspective that, the 
inconclusive results regarding short-term profitability notwithstanding, the business case 
version of CSR holds “firm ground in the commonsense of the field” as “consultancies, 
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auditing firms, SRIs, and CSR indices routinely invoke the business case in general and 
its value as a risk-management device in particular in order to ground CSR in the 
universe of an expert legitimated rational order.”93 
Support for the long-term approach to the business case for CSR can also be 
found in the ethical context as a form of “enlightened self-interest theory.” This theory 
holds that persons who act to further the interests of others ultimately serve their own 
interest.
94
 In this way, enlightened self-interest is used as an important argument in favor 
CSR: “the belief that it is in business’s long-term self-interest – enlightened self-interest 
– to be socially responsible. If business is to have a healthy climate in which to function 
in the future, it must take actions now that will ensure its long-term viability.”95 Janda et 
al argue, for example, that CSR may serve the self-interests of corporations in ways that 
may not necessarily be reflected in short-term profit: cost savings and increased 
efficiency (through, for example, energy savings and reduction of employee 
absenteeism); improved risk management; improved employee recruitment and retention; 
and building corporate brand and attracting customers.
96
   
Another closely related concept is “enlightened shareholder theory.” This 
approach to CSR encourages “cooperative inclusive relationships” between the 
shareholders and those affected (e.g. stakeholders) only when there is an economic case 
for it.
97
 Macve and Chen argue, for example, that  
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“[i]n between the traditional “shareholder value maximization” theory 
which argues for the shareholders’ interests exclusively, and “stakeholder” 
theories, which call for a fair consideration of all parties for their own 
sakes, enlightened shareholder theory has been promoted both as the most 
theoretically defensible and as the most practical corporate goal in the 
modern business world, where it is generally labeled as “the business 
case” for CSR.”98  
 
They point out that a real world example of this theory may now be found in the 
recent addition of section 172 to the U.K. Companies Act 2006,
99
 which, they argue, 
“imposes a duty on directors to ‘have regard’ to other stakeholder interests – in particular 
of the employees, the community and the environment – and to any long-term 
consequences of their decisions,” but only within “their pursuit of the primary objective 
“to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members [i.e. shareholders] 
as a whole.””100  
 
2.4 Debunking the Voluntary vs. Mandatory Debate 
The lack of a unified definition of CSR may also be attributed to the fact that the 
line between voluntary and mandatory corporate conduct is no longer as clear as once 
thought. It is true that CSR was initially understood in terms of voluntary corporate 
action, and that the emphasis on voluntary approaches was the primary focus of CSR at 
the turn of the millennium.
101
 However, Janda et al point out that CSR is now understood 
in wider terms to include both voluntary and mandatory corporate behavior and 
interactions with a variety of internal and external stakeholders and constituencies 
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(employees, customers, regulators and society).
102
 As a result, CSR commentators are 
increasingly recognizing that the debate between voluntary and mandatory conduct is 
misguided: voluntary and mandatory approaches may now overlap to form a variety of 
approaches to CSR.
103
   
Despite this, it is still useful to understand why the voluntary versus mandatory 
debate was important and why it no longer applies. Commentators note that part of the 
confusion in this area is caused by the fact that different definitions of CSR are typically 
presented with different political, social and corporate agendas in mind.
104
 For example, 
they note that businesses themselves may seek to avoid mandatory regulation by 
emphasizing the importance of voluntary initiatives, arguing that only voluntary 
corporate conduct amounts to CSR.
105
 More generally, commentators have identified a 
number of conceptual benefits associated with voluntary initiatives from a regulatory 
perspective: they place responsibility at the corporate level where the available 
information and ability to impact outcomes may be maximized; they may be more 
flexible and easy to implement than mandatory regulation; they can be less costly than 
regulation; and, in theory at least, voluntary initiatives may lead to higher levels of 
corporate compliance with the requirements.
106
  
Despite this, commentators point out that there are also a number of drawbacks 
associated with voluntary approaches. For example, voluntary initiatives are typically 
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non-binding in nature and may not be enough to achieve responsible corporate conduct in 
practice.
107
 In this regard, an often-cited 2003 study by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that voluntary initiatives typically do not 
result in improvements beyond the outcomes expected without them.
108
 Commentators 
also note that business may support voluntary initiatives precisely because they can be 
used to argue against the adoption of formal laws. This is a drawback to the extent that it 
may ultimately serve to prevent regulatory action that is needed to address social or 
environmental concerns.
109
   
The mandatory versus voluntary debate can also be framed in terms of “command 
and control regulation” versus “self-regulation.” Command and control regulation refers 
to the imposition of regulatory requirements, backed up by sanctions and other 
enforcement mechanisms.
110
 Self-regulation refers to regulatory schemes organized and 
adopted by individual companies, or their trade associations or professional bodies. As is 
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the case with the EPs, this typically involves a requirement for members to adhere to 
some form of voluntary code or framework of rules.
111
  
Like the mandatory versus voluntary debate, however, the line between command 
and control and self-regulation is not always clear and, in any event, there are several 
drawbacks associated with mandatory regulatory initiatives. For example, one of the 
main problems is that, in certain contexts, this style of regulation may be ineffective to 
the extent that it is less tailored to industry needs and less responsive to quickly evolving 
situations.
112
 Further, this imprecision and lack of flexibility may, in some cases, inspire 
“a race to the bottom” making legal compliance little more than a “box-ticking” 
exercise.
113
  
More broadly, commentators note that insistence on regulatory initiatives may 
also reflect an overly simplistic view of the law and how it guides corporate behavior.
114
 
They note that it is uncontroversial to say that few regulatory regimes are bullet-proof 
such that significant grey areas exist regarding how any specific law should be 
interpreted and followed.
115
 As a result, they argue that companies may be able to 
determine their own substantive compliance with technical regulatory standards.
116
 
Moreover, commentators note that some corporations might even see non-compliance 
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with a regulation as efficient on a pure cost/benefit analysis.
117
 Ultimately, however, they 
point out that the existence of a legal loophole should not be the only determining factor: 
a responsible corporation would seek to comply with the spirit of the law rather than 
trying to find ways around it.
118
  
As a result, like the mandatory versus voluntary debate, commentators now 
recognize that the command and control versus self-regulation debate is misguided for 
several reasons. They advocate for a broader understanding of regulation which 
recognizes that rules may not have to be legally binding and enforceable to be 
effective.
119
 Also, commentators argue that, although many CSR-related issues are 
already heavily regulated, for example, in areas of work place health and safety, 
environment and consumer protection, voluntary initiatives in these areas may ultimately 
have an impact by shaping the background against which companies operate.
120
   
Finally, commentators note that some governments and regulators are 
increasingly recognizing that effective regulation involves an understanding of all of the 
factors that influence corporate behavior and how these can be used to achieve regulatory 
goals.
121
 As evidence of this, they point to alternative regulatory techniques already in 
use such as incentives and awards, accreditation systems, market-based initiatives and 
compensation schemes, disclosure obligations and other privately or publicly sponsored 
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initiatives.
122 
 As a result of these developments, commentators argue that the crucial 
question today is not “whether CSR should be voluntary or mandatory, but, in light of a 
particular problem, what is the best response?”123  
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CHAPTER 3 CSR IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT  
This Chapter turns away from the on-going academic debate canvassed in Chapter 
2 to argue that CSR has largely won the battle of ideas in Canada. The purpose is to set 
the stage for the remainder of this thesis by arguing that, the lack of a universally 
accepted theoretical model for CSR notwithstanding, practical examples of CSR can now 
be observed in this country. More specifically, the second part of this Chapter argues that 
the emergence of CSR principles can be observed in the regulation and market practices 
of the Canadian financial services industry and several developments in this area are 
discussed.  
 
3.1 Social Context in Canada   
There can be little doubt that the concept of CSR has gained wide acceptance in 
practice in Canada. For example, the Canadian Government confirms the relevance of 
CSR on instrumentalist grounds as follows: 
“Industry Canada promotes CSR principles and practices to Canadian 
businesses because it makes companies more innovative, productive, and 
competitive. CSR helps make Canadian business more competitive by 
supporting operational efficiency gains; improved risk management; 
favourable relations with the investment community and improved access 
to capital; enhanced employee relations; stronger relationships with 
communities and an enhanced licence to operate; and improved reputation 
and branding.”124 
 
Similarly, Canada’s department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
confirms the ethical obligations on Canadian companies operating abroad as follows:  
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“Canada is a strong supporter of CSR. The Government of Canada expects 
and encourages all Canadian companies working internationally to respect 
all applicable laws and international standards, to operate transparently 
and in consultation with host governments and local communities, and to 
conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner. We work with the Canadian business community, civil society 
groups, foreign governments and communities, as well as other 
stakeholders to foster and promote CSR.”125 
 
Janda et al note that CSR principles may also be underpinned by private law in 
Canada as they inform standards of care in civil liability and to the extent that they are 
incorporated into the contractual commitments of companies.
126
 Moreover, they point out 
in this context that the common law and courts are now emerging as important parts of 
CSR as companies that cause negative social and environmental impacts may be liable 
under tort law.
127
 More broadly, other Canadian writers in this area claim that CSR has 
largely “won the battle of ideas” in that, practically speaking, few corporations today 
would argue publicly against the need for CSR efforts.
128
   
It is interesting to note, however, that commentators have identified different 
social and political contexts for CSR in Canada than might exist elsewhere.
 
In the U.S., 
for example, commentators point out that the notion of CSR gained popular awareness in 
the 1960s and 1970s with the emerging civil rights movements.
129
 They argue that 
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increasing awareness of social issues was combined with a belief that corporations should 
also be asked to make their own contributions to society.
130
 In the context of voluntary 
CSR initiatives for example, it is understood that voluntary corporate codes of conduct 
“first emerged in the United States in the 1970s in response to bad publicity caused by 
U.S. companies engaging in bribery when operating abroad, but later came to include 
industry wide codes of conduct covering environmental practices and labor standards as 
well.”131 
In the U.K., commentators note that the trend away from command and control 
type regulation began in the 1970s with the introduction of economic liberalism and 
adherence to the idea that small government would drive economic success.
132
 Under this 
view, they point out that there was a belief that unnecessary government intervention in 
the markets had damaged productivity and competitiveness and it followed that any 
regulation in this area should be minimal. In this context, they argue that CSR emerged at 
least in part as a way for U.K. companies to regulate themselves using voluntary 
initiatives.
133
  
In Canada, Foster and Meinhard have identified that CSR emerged somewhat 
later in the 1980s, and largely as an ideological response to Canada’s own shifting 
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political philosophies.
134
 They note that during the 1980s and 1990s, Canada was 
evolving into a neo-conservative philosophy of statehood and that this, coupled with 
forces of globalization, accelerated a “shift in priorities from domestic welfare 
considerations to global economic strategies.”135 They argue that, in response to this shift 
in political philosophy, there was a corresponding (and newly expressed) concern that “in 
addition to government support of universal social programs, corporations should act as 
responsible social citizens …”136   
Interestingly, this shift in ideology occurred at around the same time as significant 
increases in CSR activity were observed in Canada in the 1990s through the turn of the 
millennium.
137
 On this point, Keith notes, for example, that CSR reporting rates for 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange rose from 35 percent in 2001 to 60 
percent in 2003 and then to 80 percent by 2007.
138
 Further, Keith argues that growing 
public concern over the role of corporations during this period led to the establishment of 
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the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission to promote national 
CSR.
139
  
However, despite these early developments and wins for CSR, it is important to 
point out that the business case for CSR has not been fully established in Canada. On the 
issue of the relationship between CSR and financial performance, for example, Foster and 
Meinhard reviewed a number of early Canadian studies in this area which showed that 
the relationship between firm social performance and financial performance produced 
inconclusive results.
140
 They also reviewed more recent research during the 1990s that 
produced similarly conflicting results: some studies found evidence of a positive 
relationship while others found that no connection exists.
141
  
In their own study, though, Foster and Meinhard considered the relationship 
between public relations prominence of CSR activities and financial performance of 
Ontario-based companies. They found that companies that gave more prominence to CSR 
activities on their website and in their annual reports were also more likely to have high 
scores on corporate citizenship, which included financial performance in their study.
142
 
They noted that this result was consistent with some elements of the previous research 
that showed a positive relationship between social disclosure and financial performance, 
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implying that a “virtuous circle” may exist in Canada with CSR as both a predictor and a 
consequence of financial performance.
143
 
 
 
(a) Bill C-300 
A notable step forward for CSR in the Canadian legal context occurred in 2009 
with the introduction of a private member’s bill by John McKay, then a Liberal M.P. 
from Scarborough East: the Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas 
Corporations in Developing Countries Act
144
(Bill C-300). Bill C-300 was intended to 
promote social and environmental awareness relating to extractive companies who were 
receiving Canadian government support to operate in developing countries.
145
 Despite its 
eventual defeat, Keith argues that Bill C-300 remains an important development in the 
Canadian CSR movement because it raised awareness in these areas and ultimately led to 
the development of certain CSR initiatives by the Conservative government of Stephen 
Harper.
146
 As most notable amongst these developments, Keith points to the recent 
activity and work by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 
defining and implementing CSR.
147
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More specifically, Seck points out that Bill C-300 was significant because it 
would have given the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade the power to 
develop corporate accountability standards and a complaint reporting process for the 
Canadian extractive industry.
148
 Further, Seck describes that Bill C-300 contemplated that 
the corporate accountability standards were in turn expected to incorporate, among 
others, the social and environmental standards of the IFC. This is significant according to 
Seck in that it was consistent with other initiatives indicating that the IFC’s standards 
were to be used as a reference point for Canadian mining companies.
149
 A more 
controversial issue, however, was whether Bill C-300, by adopting the IFC’s standards, 
would also have imposed international human rights standards on Canadian 
companies.
150
    
Ultimately, Seck points out that Bill C-300 received significant support with some 
commentators arguing on instrumentalist grounds that that it would give Canadian 
companies in this area a competitive advantage over others by providing a forum to 
address complaints and by requiring companies to respect human rights, thus reducing 
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the chance of operations being disrupted by local communities experiencing unrest.”151 
Despite this support, however, many critics contended that Bill C-300 was flawed from 
the outset from a policy perspective,  arguing that the penalties contemplated were not in 
line with procedural processes, and that Canadian mining companies could be unfairly 
targeted by a complaints process that could easily be abused by competitors.
152
 As a 
result, Bill C-300, having been attacked by its critics and having received little political 
support, was narrowly defeated by the Conservatives and died in the House of Commons 
on October 27, 2010.
153
  
 
3.2 CSR in Canadian Financial Services 
This Section argues that CSR can now be situated in the context of the Canadian 
financial services sector. Much of this analysis is based on the work of Benjamin 
Richardson, a Canadian legal scholar in this area, who confirms that the “potential of 
private financial organizations to be a force for environmentally and socially sound 
development is no longer regarded as quackery, but as a serious issue gaining some 
policy-makers’ attention.”154  Interestingly, the developments in this area can also be used 
on analogous grounds to situate the social contract approach to CSR in the Canadian 
financial sector.
155
 In the context of banking specifically, for example, Nicholls points out 
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that, as Canadian financial institutions continue to grow in size and power, consideration 
is being given to market conduct regulation to prevent unfair business practices and to 
“community reinvestment” or “public utility” regulatory approaches.156 Nicholls points 
out that this is evidence of the public’s perception that banks are generally not subject to 
effective market discipline and need to be more closely regulated.
157
  
Moreover, from a social concern perspective, Canadian courts have also already 
recognized that banks are the focal point of the commercial operations of our society as 
reported decisions acknowledge that banks generally enjoy good profit margins and 
operate in a regulated environment where there are relatively few eligible participants. In 
return for these privileges, these decisions have held that it may be fair to impose 
additional social duties on banks; for example, to take certain steps to protect consumers 
and the public from fraud and other illegal activities in the banking system.
158
 In addition, 
Canadian banks with equity of more than one billion dollars are required, under section 
459.3 of the Bank Act, to “. . . annually publish a statement describing the contribution of 
the bank and its prescribed affiliates to the Canadian economy and society.”159 As such, 
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most large Canadian banks build on the contents of this annual public accountability 
requirement to create an annual CSR report that they publish on their websites.
160
 
As a starting point, however, it is important to point out that the traditional (and 
more natural) focus of financial regulation and oversight in Canada is typically on 
prudential standards: solvency and liquidity requirements and avoiding risks to banks and 
the broader economy.
161
 The primary regulatory goals in this area are to protect 
depositors’ and investors’ funds and to avoid broader systemic risks that arise from the 
linkages that necessarily exist among financial institutions so that no solvency situation 
arises that could put the entire system at risk.
162
  
Richardson notes that environmental and social issues traditionally did not fit into 
this framework as those who traded in money were often seen as irrelevant to CSR and 
the “province of social responsibility was not normally associated with banks, pension 
funds, or other financiers.”163 As a result, Richardson argues there remained an 
“enormous abyss” between financial regulation and CSR in Canada as there was virtually 
no reference to CSR considerations in domestic financial laws.
164
 Rather, Richardson 
argues with specific reference to environmental regulation, that Canadian government 
strategy has been to treat these areas of policy as distinct, to be regulated separately:  
                                                 
160
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“[e]nvironmental regulation in Canada, as in most other nations, hardly 
addresses the financial services sector—the banks and investors that 
finance development. To most environmental lawyers, this might seem a 
strange comment, as the province of environmental law is not normally 
associated with banks, pension funds, or other financiers. If anything, 
those who trade in money are seen as rather environmentally innocuous or 
irrelevant, away from the main action, … . Although Canada has made 
great strides in improving its environmental laws since the 1970s, this lack 
of interaction between environmental and financial policy is arguably 
Canadian environmental law’s greatest handicap.”165 
 
There is, however, evidence that things are beginning to change. Richardson 
points out that the trend is shifting as scholars and some policy makers are increasingly 
recognizing the importance of the financial sector to CSR: based on their “ability to 
provide financial leverage, financial organizations are in effect “gate keepers” to the 
economy … principally because they have amassed vast empires of financial assets.”166 
Richardson therefore argues that the biggest CSR impact of private financial institutions 
is not their own social or ecological footprints, but, rather, their “strategic role in 
allocating capital to other businesses.”167 Further, Richardson argues that this area is 
growing in importance to the study of CSR as the “institutionalization” of financial 
markets has put financial assets in Canada “increasingly into the control of banks, 
pension funds, and other financial institutions, rather than into the hands of individual 
retail investors.”168  
In addition to these developments, it is also well established that secondary 
reasons for government regulation of financial services in Canada may include more 
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socially orientated goals: “consumer protection” and “minimizing fraud through money 
laundering and terrorism.”169 Ogilvie argues, for example, that the financial system 
requires honesty and trust to operate smoothly so regulation is needed to keep fraud and 
consumer exploitation to a minimum.
170
 Interestingly, a similar justification is used by 
OSFI, traditionally viewed as prudential regulator only, for its intervention into Canada’s 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime.
171
 
Beyond this, CSR scholars have also identified the increasing importance that 
social and environmental pressures have on marketing financial products and services. 
For example, Richardson notes that greater awareness in this area has led to a 
proliferation of social and environmental financial products, including “green mortgages, 
ethical mutual funds and pollution damage liability insurance.”172 There is also evidence 
of an emerging niche for ethical financing in Canada’s financial markets: Richardson 
cites a national survey conducted in 2002 by the Social Investment Organization which 
identified assets of environmentally and socially responsible investments as of June 2002 
at CDN $ 51.4 billion.
173
 In addition, Richardson argues that there are some features of 
financial products and institutions themselves that should support a commitment to 
sustainable and long-term goals. For example, he argues that “because of their extended 
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product liabilities, life insurance companies and pension funds should be biased toward 
longer-term sustainable investments.”174  
Finally, as discussed in the remainder of this thesis, Richardson points out that 
banks should have an interest in the long-term viability of a borrower’s business in the 
context of ensuring loan repayment, which can often be contracted over lengthy 
periods.
175
 Similarly, Janda et al argue that social and environmental performance could 
become important factors to consider in the loan underwriting process for banks.
176
 On 
this point, Weber recently studied the efforts of several Canadian banks to integrate 
environmental risks into their corporate loan requirements and found that they were “best 
in class” in conducting environmental due diligence when compared to their global 
peers.
177
 Along these lines, the instant thesis tests whether the EPs are also a good 
example of this development as they are intended to provide a credit risk management 
framework for managing environmental and social risks in project finance transactions.
178
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3.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter argues that the emergence of CSR can be observed in Canada and, 
more specifically, the Canadian financial services industry. In particular, scholars have 
identified that, with the growing economic importance and influence of financial 
institutions, we should expect to see growing demands that these organizations act more 
responsibly. However, expectations in this area should be tempered by the reality that 
CSR remains in a state of flux and has yet to gain universal acceptance in this industry 
sector. In Canada, in particular, significant work remains to be done to advance CSR 
related theory in financial services. Moreover, additional work will be needed in this 
context to establish the business case for CSR and, in particular, the long-term benefits 
that it may offer for firms in the financial sector. 
Using this background, the remainder of this thesis tests whether the practical 
emergence of CSR can be observed in the context of the decision by Canadian banks to 
adopt and adhere to the EPs. Ultimately, this case study will show that it is not clear 
whether these developments demonstrate a clear commitment by banks to CSR, or 
whether they are just reflections of prudent self-interested lending practices. Ultimately, 
the business case for CSR suggests that it is likely to be some combination of the two.  
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CHAPTER 4 – INTRODUCTION TO THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides an overview of the EPs. As noted in the introduction to this 
thesis, major global banks, together with the IFC and the World Bank Group developed 
the EPs on June 4, 2003, to “provide a credit risk management framework for 
determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in international 
project finance transactions.”179 The EPs are based on the IFC’s social and environmental 
policy framework, including the Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, Pollution 
Prevention and Abatement Guidelines.
180
 These IFC policies have evolved into what are 
currently known and referred to in this thesis as the “IFC’s Performance Standards.” In 
order to reflect developments in the IFC’s Performance Standards, the EPs requirements 
were revised and updated on July 6, 2006 and became the EP II. 
At the time of writing, the EPs are undergoing another strategic review process to 
reflect recent updates to the IFC’s Performance Standards.181  The EPs Association 
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released a draft of the revised and updated EPs (now referred to as EP III) for comment 
and the formal Consultation and Public Comment period for the EP III closed on October 
12, 2012.
182
  The EPs Association launched the EP III effective as of June 4, 2013, but 
the effective date is subject to a transition period that will allow member banks to 
continue using the current version of the EP II until December 31, 2013.
183
 As such, this 
thesis focuses on EP II (referred to in this thesis as the EPs) and a brief overview of the 
EPs is provided in this Chapter, along with a description of the requirements they 
currently prescribe for member banks generally.
184
 The concluding Chapter of this thesis 
provides a discussion of the EP III update process in order to support further study in this 
area as the updated principles are implemented in the second half of 2013 and into 
2014.
185
  
As discussed below, the EPs represent a series of guidelines on the management 
of social and environmental risks that banks voluntarily commit to follow in their project 
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financing activities.
186
 As a result, this Chapter proceeds on the basis that the EPs provide 
a real-world arena in which to study CSR in its broader forms: the idea adopted earlier in 
this thesis that “a corporation must act in a responsible manner with regard to the 
environment, community and broader society in which it operates.”187 The last Section of 
this Chapter addresses some of the interesting international events that occurred on the 
international project financing stage that led up to the development of the EPs.   
 
4.2 Overview of the EPs 
The EPs can be understood from a corporate governance perspective as an 
example of industry self-regulation at the global level.
188
 As a voluntary code of conduct, 
the principles apply only when a bank chooses to sign on to them and agrees to follow 
certain requirements with respect to its project financing activities.
189
 Specifically, 
member banks commit under the EPs that they will not provide loans to projects where 
total capital costs will exceed U.S. $ 10 million and where the borrower will not or 
cannot comply with the bank’s own social and environmental policies.190  
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Under Principle 1, each adopting bank is required to undertake a characterization 
exercise in respect of new projects being considered for financing:  
 Category A represents projects with potentially significant adverse social 
or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented; 
 
 Category B represents projects with potentially limited adverse social or 
environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific, 
largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures; and 
 
 Category C represents projects with minimal or no social or environmental 
impacts.
191
  
 
Under Principle 2, for Category A and B projects, each bank commits to satisfy 
itself that the key environmental and social issues identified during the categorization 
process are properly addressed in a social and environmental assessment (Assessment) 
that must be provided by the project’s sponsor or borrower.192 In addition, under 
Principles 4 and 5, a project’s sponsor will be required to prepare and implement an 
Action Plan (AP), establish a social and environmental management system, consult with 
various stakeholders, and report on the implementation of the AP.
193
  
Under Principle 6, the borrower is required to establish a grievance mechanism as 
part of the management system in order to ensure that consultation, disclosure and 
community engagement continues throughout construction and operation of the 
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project.
194
 Under Principle 8, the EPs’ requirements must also be inserted into loan 
covenants in the financing documents compelling the borrower to comply with the AP 
during construction and operation of the project, and to provide regular reports on 
compliance with the AP.
195
  
Finally, Principle 10 requires banks to satisfy ongoing reporting requirements.
196
 
Generally, the EPs Association states that this reporting should at a minimum include the 
number of transactions screened by the member bank, including the categorization 
accorded to transactions (and may include a breakdown by sector or region), and 
information regarding implementation.
197
 
 
4.3 Development of the EPs  
The trends leading up to the development and adoption of the EPs in 2003 are 
covered extensively in the literature. Writers in this area have identified that the 
principles arose in the context of pressure from institutional investors and NGOs as 
private banks began to do more project financing after the withdrawal of the World Bank 
Group and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) from the market in the 
1990s.
198
 They point out that, as private banks began to do more financing in emerging 
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economies to fill the void left by the MDBs, many of them inevitably became embroiled 
in their own projects with negative social and environmental impacts.
199
  As a result, 
commentators argue the EPs emerged in the aftermath of these developments as a way for 
banks to control and mitigate the negative impacts of the projects they were financing.
200
  
The narrative in this area generally begins with a description of the withdrawal of 
MDBs from international project financing in the 1990s over social and environmental 
concerns.
201
 Commentators point out that project financing typically occurs in industries 
with increased risk of negative social and environmental impacts: extractive industries, 
and energy and transportation infrastructure.
202
 Moreover, they note that infrastructure 
projects are often very large and can have substantial social and ecological footprints in 
sensitive areas.
203
 Based on these observations, commentators argue that the withdrawal 
of MDBs from project finance was precipitated by the fact that they were being 
increasingly targeted by negative publicity and pressure over their involvement in these 
types of projects.
204
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This withdrawal of MDBs from international project financing occurred in the 
face of increasing demand for financing for new and developing infrastructure projects. 
This was particularly true, according to Wright, in developing countries where the 
financing demands for such projects often far exceeded the resources available locally.
205
 
On this point, the International Project Finance Association notes, for example, that  
“[i]n the face of an ever increasing world population, greater expectations, 
demands from society and budgetary constraints, governments are facing 
an increasing amount of pressure to deliver new and improved 
infrastructure projects in transport (roads, railways, bridges); education 
(schools and universities); healthcare (hospitals, clinics and treatment 
centers); waste management (collection, disposal, waste to energy plants); 
water (collection, treatment, distribution), government accommodation 
and defense.”206  
 
In short, the money for these projects had to come from somewhere, and the stage 
was set for private banks to enter the international project financing market.
207
 However, 
commentators point out that, unlike the World Bank Group and MDBs, the mission of 
private banks is not typically focused on social and sustainability issues.
208
 Hardenbrook 
in particular identifies this fact, along with the lack of significant regulation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
stakeholders, the World Bank Group and other MDBs were forced to pull out of such large projects as the 
Narmada Valley series of dams in India.  
 
205
 Christopher Wright, “Global Banks, the Environment, and Human Rights: The Impact of the Equator 
Principles on Lending Policies and Practices” (2012) 12 Global Environmental Politics 56 [Wright] at 57-
58. 
 
206
 See the International Project Finance Association website, online at: 
http://www.ipfa.org/about/projectfinance/benefits.asp. 
 
207
 See e.g., the discussion by Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 543-544. See also e.g., Karen Cook 
“Dam shame: activists target global financiers of Chinese eco disaster” (2000) The Village Voice [Cook]; 
electronic copy available online at: www.villagevoice.com/2000-03-28/news/dam-shame/2. Cook argues 
that banks that that had once viewed emerging markets as too risky now saw good potential for profit and 
provides as support for this proposition the fact that, during the 1990s, public development assistance to 
developing countries remained steady at approximately U.S. $ 60 billion a year, while investment from 
private capital sources increased from U.S. $ 30 billion in 1990 to U.S. $ 212 billion in 1996. 
 
208
 Hardenbrook, supra note 199 at 205. 
 
62 
 
 
enforcement in developing nations, as contributing to a scenario in which project 
sponsors and their banks were in many cases free to set their own standards for 
development projects.
209
 Moreover, since establishing and enforcing social and 
environmental standards increases the costs of a project, little incentive existed to impose 
strict standards in this area. The result of this combination, according to Hardenbrook, 
was that privately financed projects often resulted in significant negative social and 
environmental impacts.
210
 Similarly, Lawrence and Thomas argue on this point that, 
absent the involvement of an MDB, it was highly unlikely that private social and 
environmental standards would be imposed on any given project.
211
 Given this 
background, it is not surprising that, as they began to do more financing in emerging 
economies to the fill the void left by the MDBs, many private banks became embroiled in 
their own projects with negative publicity over significant social and environmental 
impacts.
212
  
In fact, although no one incident or project is said to have triggered the 
development and adoption of the EPs, the literature identifies the public backlash from 
the private sector financing of the highly controversial Three Gorges Dam Project 
(TGDP) in the Peoples Republic of China as having played a significant role.
213
 The 
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGPC) identifies December 14, 1994, as the official 
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kick off date for TGDP on the Yangtze River. It now claims to be one of the largest 
hydropower-complex projects in the world with twenty-six turbine-generator units, each 
with installed capacity of 700MW, sending electricity to Central China, East China, 
Guangdong, and Chongqing, with a maximum transmission range of over 1000 
kilometers.
214
 
Aside from being one of the largest hydro-electric installations in the world, 
TGDP was by all accounts also an incredibly expensive undertaking. Although there are 
no universally accepted publicly available figures, original estimates put the cost of the 
project at U.S. $ 9 billion and this estimate more than doubled by 2000, and is expected 
to have been close to U.S. $ 57 billion by completion.
215
 Cook notes that, with the 
withdrawal of World Bank Group over social and environmental concerns, the Chinese 
government looked to external funding from large international private banks.
216
 As a 
result, Cook describes a financing structure in which bonds were issued for the State 
Development Bank of China, which in turn loaned money to TGDP, and several major 
private banks acted as the arrangers on the initial Chinese bond offerings.
217
 
Almost from the outset of TGDP, commentators predicted social and ecological 
catastrophe for the surrounding areas and the project and its financiers received 
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significant (and well documented) negative attention from NGOs.
218
 As a result, some 
commentators now look back to TGDP as representing a “watershed moment” in the 
international NGO movement as pressure began to be directed primarily at private 
banks.
219
 They note that, until the time of TGDP, NGOs were focused on public 
development finance and, in particular, lending from the World Bank Group and other 
MDBs.
220
 However, after TGDP, environmentalists and NGOs began to adopt their 
approach to advocacy by attacking private project financiers directly.
221
 Wright refers to 
this phenomenon as the “boomerang effect:” NGOs effectively drew on their existing 
advocacy networks previously used to launch successful campaigns against the World 
Bank Group and other MDBs.
222
 Wright argues that “[a]pplying this strategy to the world 
of private finance, local community groups and international NGOs sought to halt 
projects by confronting commercial banks at the project level in countries hosting their 
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investments and at the corporate headquarters and consumer bank branches in their home 
countries.”223  
 
4.4 Conclusion   
The scholarship in this area confirms that the EPs emerged in the aftermath of 
negative publicity campaigns against private banks brought about by their financing of 
large international projects like TGDP.
224
 In the context of these developments, 
commentators argue that, even in cases where the project sponsor or direct borrower is a 
profitable company, private banks may still face increased risks from associated negative 
social and environmental impacts that might slow down or shut down a project.
225
 As a 
result, it is now understood that“[i]n these cases, financial institutions are forced to 
consider whether the environmental and social risks of the project, including potential 
damages to their corporate reputation, will outweigh any short and long-term financial 
benefits that the project may generate.”226 As discussed in Chapter 5, it is in this context 
that the EPs emerged at least in part as a logical and business orientated response to these 
concerns: a way for private banks to control the negative social and environmental 
outcomes of the projects they are associated with.   
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CHAPTER 5 – THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE EPS 
This Chapter provides a review of the EPs related scholarship that has emerged 
since the principles were launched in 2003. Section 5.1 considers a fundamental question 
posed by scholars: why would banks and other profit maximizing financial institutions 
voluntarily develop and adopt a code like the EPs? A review of several papers that 
address this apparent contradiction is provided to show that pragmatic business 
motivations are behind EPs adoption: it is generally accepted in this scholarship that 
banks look to the principles to reduce certain credit and reputational risks. As a result, 
Section 5.1 concludes that the EPs represent an example of the business case for CSR.
227
  
Turning away from the issue of why banks adopt the EPs, Section 5.2 provides a 
review of the theoretical CSR framework for the EPs developed in the literature. It is 
generally well accepted in this scholarship that the principles amount to a voluntary code, 
thereby evidencing an example of the new form of regulation known as “soft law.”228 
Finally, Section 5.3 canvasses some of the concerns that have emerged regarding 
EPs’ compliance and the so-called “free-rider” problem. As noted, one of the main 
drawbacks of voluntary CSR initiatives like the EPs remains that they often lack the 
necessary procedural and enforcement measures to implement compliance and effectively 
promote CSR values. As a result, in the case of the EPs specifically, critics now argue 
that banks may get the reputational benefit of EPs adoption irrespective of their 
implementation and compliance practices.  
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5.1 EPs Adoption   
The scholarship in this area confirms that the EPs have gained wide acceptance in 
the global banking community. Macve and Chen cite to an EPs press release that states 
that 71 percent of total project finance debts in emerging market economies were 
subjected to EPs in 2007 (U.S. $ 52.9 billion out of a total of U.S. $ 74.6 billion).
229
 
Similarly, Conley and Williams note that an estimated 85 percent of international project 
financing in emerging markets was expected to be subject to the EPs as of 2011.
230
 More 
generally, other commentators argue that the EPs’ impact on the financial sector has been 
far greater than predicted.
231
 Wright and Rwabizambuga describe the EPs’ effective 
market penetration among the world’s largest project finance providers, noting that all 
but three of the top ten global arrangers of project finance loans have signed on to the 
EPs.
232
 Similarly, Amalric notes that the EPs have become one of the more visible and 
concrete global initiatives promoting social concerns and sustainable development.
233
  
Given this wide-spread adoption rate, a significant body of legal, economic and 
business literature has emerged to consider banks’ motivations for joining the EPs. The 
dominant theme in this scholarship is that adopters of the EPs see the principles as good 
for business, even if, for any one bank, they increase short-term costs and limit growth 
opportunities: 
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“[i]n one way or another, the creators of the EPs see them as good for 
business, even if, for any one bank in the near term, they increase the costs 
of evaluating potential loans and monitoring on-going compliance, and 
may even limit opportunities. That banks articulate instrumental motives 
should not surprise us, since we (and the law) expect business managers to 
make decisions that they perceive to be in the interests of their firm and its 
shareholders.”234  
 
On this point, Amalric argues that, as with other instances of industry self-
regulation, the EPs raise crucial questions about motivation: “[i]f the banks’ overarching 
aim is to maximize firm value, what is their interest in participating in a self-regulatory 
initiative?”235 Several papers have considered this question. In his own research, Amalric 
notes that the costs of EPs adoption to member banks are easily identified: (i) the costs of 
identifying the potential social and environmental risks of a project in order to categorize 
it according to the EPs’ requirements; (ii) the costs of checking the adequacy of the 
reports and information provided by borrowers; (iii) the costs of monitoring compliance; 
(iv) the costs of enforcing compliance; and (v) the overall opportunity cost of turning 
down project deals that do not comply with EPs’ requirements.236  
As a result, Amalric notes that banks engage in a cost-benefit analysis: the 
expected benefits in adopting the EPs should outweigh the expected costs of 
compliance.
237
 Similarly, Scholtens and Dam considered incentives for EPs adoption 
using microeconomic analysis and concluded that individual banks are likely to engage in 
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the EPs only if the perceived benefits exceed the associated costs.
238
 Hardenbrook 
concludes on this point in more general terms that:   
“[b]y incorporating environmental provisions in loan agreements, the 
EPFIs increase a project’s transaction cost. This increase directly impacts 
the profits of the company constructing the project and thereby affects its 
ability to repay the loan. At first blush, it appears that adopting the 
Equator Principles would be detrimental to a private institution’s goal of 
increasing shareholder profit. Since the Equator Principles appear to be 
detrimental to a bank’s interest, it is important to identify the incentives 
that encourage banks to adopt the Equator Principles.”239 
 
(a) Incentives for EPs Adoption 
As will be discussed in further detail below, the literature identifies two principal 
benefits for banks associated with EPs adoption. Both of these are held to be instrumental 
motivations, in that they allow EPs member banks to advance their own interests:
240
  
(i) the management of the credit risk inherent in global project financing; and 
  
(ii) the mitigation of the reputational risk of being associated with projects 
that result in negative social and environmental impacts. 
  
(i) Managing risks in project finance 
Several authors have looked at the emergence of the EPs as a way for adopting 
banks to reduce their exposure to lending or credit risks inherent in project financing.
241
 
In this regard, the EPs Association itself confirms that for “a number of years, banks 
working in the Project Finance sector had been seeking ways to assess and manage the 
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environmental and social risks associated with such investment activities.”242 The 
inherent lending risks are easily identified within the technical definition of project 
financing adopted by the EPs:  
“Project finance (PF) is a method of funding in which the lender looks 
primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the source 
of repayment and as security for the exposure. This type of financing is 
usually for large, complex and expensive installations that might include, 
for example, power plants, chemical processing plants, mines, 
transportation infrastructure, environment, and telecommunications 
infrastructure. Project finance may take the form of financing of the 
construction of a new capital installation, or refinancing of an existing 
installation, with or without improvements. 
 
In such transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively 
out of the money generated by the contracts for the facility’s output, such 
as the electricity sold by a power plant. The borrower is usually an SPE 
that is not permitted to perform any function other than developing, 
owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that repayment 
depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the collateral value of 
the project’s assets. In contrast, if repayment of the exposure depends 
primarily on a well-established, diversified, credit-worthy, contractually 
obligated end user for repayment, it is considered a secured exposure to 
that end-user.” 243 
 
There is no question that this form of financing is inherently risky to lenders, 
especially when compared to more conventional forms of collateralized lending. This is 
because, in project finance, the “lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a 
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single project, both as the source of repayment and as security for the exposure.”244  The 
project essentially “stands alone as a credit matter,” meaning that, if the project fails, the 
lender will have little or no recourse against the borrower’s assets for repayment of the 
loan: the lender will only be able to realize on the value of the project, including the 
project’s assets and revenue stream.245 As a result, with the “collateral in these 
arrangements being lower than in normal credit transactions, credit risks are 
automatically higher, and there is a direct link between the social and environmental risks 
of the project and the credit risks borne by the lenders.”246  
Based on this legal structure, Conley and Williams argue that many types of 
social and environmental risks that are considered externalities in conventional lending 
(e.g., a human rights issues, displacement of local population or an environmental 
disaster) may become directly significant to project finance transactions because they 
could put a lender at risk if they cause a project to be delayed or shut down.
247
 Indirect 
risks may also be present here because, as Scholtens points out, in a case where a bank is 
forced to realize on a project’s assets, there is the risk that the bank could become liable 
for contamination or threats to the surrounding population.
248
 Further, as noted below in 
Section 5.1(a)(ii) of this thesis, these issues may become especially relevant in the 
context of reputational concerns as major international projects typically attract 
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significant attention from NGOs when they are expected to result in negative social and 
environmental outcomes.  
Based on these considerations, commentators argue that a bank’s return on 
investment for any given project may in fact depend on the proper management of the 
specific social and environmental issues that are inserted into the project’s risk profile.249 
As a result, it is now well accepted in the scholarship that the initial EPs banks were 
looking for ways to “level the playing field” by establishing a minimum standard to 
which all major global project financing lenders would adhere.
 250
 Hardenbrook argues, 
for example, that  
“[b]anks have a large incentive to manage the risks of their investments 
carefully to ensure repayment of the loan. A project that creates 
environmental degradation exposes the borrower to liability. Depending 
on the country, the borrower could incur substantial fines for violating 
local environmental laws and court fees for defending against these 
lawsuits.”251 
 
(ii) Reputation risk management 
Scholars have also considered the emergence of the EPs as a tool used by banks to 
“level the playing field” among different banks facing different reputation risks in the 
project financing industry.
252
 In this regard, although the EPs are theoretically a voluntary 
code, it should be pointed out that the decision to develop and adopt the principles was 
likely forced at least in part by increased reputational risks in changing market conditions 
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(see the discussion of TGDP in Section 4.3 of this thesis).
253
 Amalric defines a bank’s 
reputation risk in this context as: 
“the probability of being a target of a public campaign multiplied by the 
cost for the bank of such a campaign … Banks with a well established 
brand name and located in countries with strong non-governmental 
organizations, are by and large more likely to be the target of public 
campaigns than small specialized banks located in countries with weak 
NGOs; and banks involved in commercial retail banking and thus 
vulnerable to consumer boycotts will likely incur higher losses than 
specialized boutiques from NGO-led public campaigns. Hence we can 
reasonably assume that banks differ in terms of reputation risk.”254 
 
Richardson notes on this point that voluntary codes like the EPs often can only be 
considered “voluntary” to the extent that their adoption is not formally obliged by 
authorities: they are “seldom if ever “voluntary” initiatives in the sense that they are 
“made autonomously and freely,” and most are “adopted because the relevant actors have 
been pressured to act.”255 Richardson notes that pressure in this area can come from any 
number of sources: threat of mandatory regulation, negative publicity, competitive 
pressures, demands from the local community and corporate stakeholders, and industry 
associations and organizations.
256
  
As support for this position in the context of the EPs, O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer 
argue that the initial banks were likely pursuing an “appeasement strategy:” the 
development of the EPs to mitigate the reputational risk caused by NGO campaigns and 
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to gain legitimacy for their financing activities.
257
 Similarly, Conley and Williams point 
out that the EPs likely represented a way to increase the adopting banks’ legitimacy in the 
context of large-scale infrastructure financing and permitted them to “counter critics of 
large development projects by asserting their ability to manage the risks created by those 
projects and simultaneously to resist further strengthening of the standards or the 
imposition of “hard law.””258 Conley and Williams also describe the EPs in this context 
as a sort of “prisoner’s dilemma:”  
“each bank faces reputational risk if it finances a project that leads to a 
social or environmental disaster, and each would presumably be better off 
avoiding such risk. But each bank also fears commercial disadvantage 
from acting alone to limit its lending. An agreement to level the playing 
field avoids this difficult choice by eliminating the commercial 
disadvantage for any one bank.”259  
 
Similarly, on this point, Amalric argues that the EPs amount to a “strategy 
devised by high reputation risk banks to restore a level playing field with their less 
exposed competitors. The purpose of the initiative is to impose the voluntary standards 
developed by the more exposed banks on all members of the industry.”260  
Commentators have also commented positively on the relationship between EPs 
adoption and the significant reputational pressures faced by primarily retail banks. In 
their study, Conley and Williams note that the importance of reputational risk is 
evidenced by the fact that, of the banks that were most active in developing the EPs, most 
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had large retail businesses making them more sensitive to their reputations.
261
 Similarly, 
Scholtens and Dam demonstrate that CSR behavior is especially displayed by banks that 
are in the “spotlight,” and that the CSR policies of EPs member banks are typically rated 
higher than non-member banks.
262
 Importantly, however, they argue that this may not be 
mere “window dressing” by banks because they observed no significant impact on the 
adopters’ stock market value when they announced adoption (implying that adoption may 
be for reasons other than immediate increase in firm value).
263
 Rather, Scholtens and 
Dam suggest that “adoption is undertaken by banks that pay a lot of attention to CSR,” 
and that adopting the EPs enables them to “signal this position to the public … and, as 
such, positively impacts the risk profile of the adopter.”264  
Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study of the proliferation of the EPs globally 
provides additional insight in this area.
265
 The authors begin by arguing that the decision 
to adopt a code of conduct that establishes a firm’s commitment to CSR is typically 
embedded in the firm’s broader reputational risk management strategies.266 This is true 
according to the authors in at least four ways: first, a firm’s overall reputation and brand 
may benefit from the adoption of CSR; second, a firm may be able to differentiate itself 
on this basis; third, a firm may view this as appropriate in the context of its overall risk 
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management strategy;
267
 and fourth, a firm may view this as a way of reducing the risk of 
being targeted by regulators and NGOs.
268
  
Based on this, Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study considers the regional adoption 
rates for the EPs among banks, and concludes that adoption rates vary significantly by 
region, and are concentrated in Western Europe and North America.
269
 The authors point 
to the strong regulatory and reputational pressures faced by Western European and North 
American financial institutions as one possible explanation for this regional adoption 
pattern. Moreover, they argue that the strong institutional environments in which western 
banks operate along with significant reputational pressures may in fact compel them to 
adopt voluntary codes like the EPs. As a result, Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study may 
be used to identify the following key characteristics of EPs banks generally:
270
  
(i) they are based in countries in which the importance of environmental and 
social issues is recognized (the authors note that this may explain the large 
share of western banks among early EPs adopters);  
 
(ii) they tend to specialize in services and functions with the most visibility 
(e.g., banks engaged in retail banking services); 
 
(iii) they are concentrated in institutional environments shaped by advocacy 
campaigns and strong regulatory systems; and  
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(iv) they typically operate transnationally and are more likely to have high 
profile roles in large international project finance deals, increasing the risk 
to their corporate reputations.  
 
(b) EPs and the Business Case for CSR 
The incentives for EPs adoption discussed in Section 5.1(a) above are all held to 
be instrumental in that they allow adopting banks to further their own interests. As a 
result, scholars have also started to consider EPs adoption as an example of the business 
case for CSR.
271
 Macve and Chen argue, for example, that the EPs may be used to 
consider how banks are determining the scope of their CSR in the context of enlightened 
shareholder theory, concluding that EPs adoption can add value to banks.
272
 They note 
that the EPs are: 
“[c]onsistent with the enlightened shareholder theory explanation of how 
banks respond to CSR and sustainability concerns, … Not only has the 
dominant political and business consensus maintained enlightened 
shareholder theory as the legal basis in the UK of corporate objectives and 
directors’ duties, it is consistent with the observed variety in level of take 
up of EP in the different economic, social and political environments in 
different countries.” 273  
 
The authors test the business case or “value add” by considering the enhanced 
mitigation of credit and reputational risks enjoyed by member banks. They conclude that 
enlightened shareholder theory is “consistent with the observed variety in level of take up 
of EP in the different economic, social and political environments” and that the EPs also 
“assist banks in building a shared social construction, in responding to stakeholder 
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pressures and concerns, of what are the current and likely future boundaries of 
enlightened shareholder theory-driven performance.”274  
Similarly, Wright and Rwabizambuga, argue that adopting a voluntary code like 
the EPs can add value to a firm. They refer specifically to improved corporate reputation 
and branding; increased competitiveness; increased access to capital markets and 
financing; and decreased scrutiny in public consultation hearings and approval processes. 
They argue that each of these factors can reduce a firm’s project cost and associated 
expenses. More generally, they argue that a firm’s adoption of a voluntary code may also 
allow it to more effectively respond to the variety of demands imposed on it by multiple 
stakeholder groups.
275
 
 
5.2 The CSR Context for the EPs   
Beyond the pragmatic literature in respect of why banks have signed on to the 
EPs, there is also an emerging body of social science literature addressing theoretical 
questions about the EPs as they relate to voluntary codes of corporate conduct, 
regulation, globalization and global governance.
276
 Commentators note generally that this 
new context has given rise to various forms of “new governance” or “private 
governance” theories that have emerged as models to govern corporate behavior.277 As 
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noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, traditional regulation seeks to control corporate conduct 
through mandatory requirements backed up by enforcement mechanisms and penalties 
for non-compliance. On the other hand, voluntary codes like the EPs may represent a 
more “reflexive” approach to guiding corporate behavior – by engaging with businesses 
to consider what form corporate behavior should take, by incentivizing businesses to act 
in certain ways and by reinforcing the need for open and transparent disclosure of 
corporate activities.
278
  
In this context, the EPs have been used by a number of authors to examine the 
development of voluntary codes. Macve and Chen argue, for example, that the EPs are an 
example of “soft-law” because of the way in which they prescribe a certain framework of 
requirements that applies only once a bank voluntarily agrees to sign on to the 
principles.
279
 Similarly, Hardenbrook notes that traditionally, private entities like banks 
were viewed as primarily reactionary to mandatory regulation, but that this “reactionary 
stance is evolving, and private institutions are beginning to take an increasingly proactive 
role by self-regulating.”280 Under this new conception, Hardenbrook argues the EPs 
represent a “proactive stance in the area of environmental regulation and are a major 
change in the private sector’s traditional role.”281 Ultimately, Hardenbrook concludes that 
the EPs therefore fall into a category of reflexive legislation known as “private second-
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order regulatory agreements,” meaning that they are agreements between private parties, 
rather than governmental organizations.
282
 
In terms of the more specific taxonomy defined by corporate code of conduct 
literature, Wright and Rwabizambuga argue that the EPs are both a “third-party” and 
“commitment” code of conduct, in that they emerged with support from the World Bank 
Group and IFC (as the third parties) and include requirements for adopters to follow (the 
commitment).
283
 Similarly, on this point, Richardson notes that  
“[c]odes of conduct, negotiated agreements, and unilateral declarations of 
commitment are some of the various means by which the private sector 
can take actions to support broader public policy goals on social and 
environmental causes. … Third parties are actors at arm’s length from 
both the individual businesses who implement the codes and from public 
authorities. They may be environmental NGOs, industry associations, 
international technical standardization bodies, or an intergovernmental 
entity such as the International Finance Corporation in the case of the 
Equator Principles.”284 
 
Interestingly, Rupp and Williams have recently gone beyond this traditional 
positioning in the CSR literature, using the EPs example to support their model of a 
psychological approach to regulation: they argue that a model of soft law that focuses on 
a broader range of motivations and moral reasoning might be more effective than current 
approaches in this area that rely primarily on instrumental motivations.
285
 The authors 
acknowledge the importance of self-interested reasons for firms to participate in soft law 
initiatives and note that they “do not mean to suggest that self-interest is not a primary 
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factor in many firm decisions.”286 They do, however, suggest that self-interest is not the 
only factor and that a model that engages in a broader range of interests has the potential 
to “more effectively encourage behaviors that optimize society’s regulatory goals than do 
approaches that rely only on appeal to the instrumental considerations or self-interest of 
the regulated entity.”287 
 
5.3 EPs Compliance and the “Free-Rider” Problem 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, one of the main drawbacks of CSR and 
voluntary initiatives like the EPs remains that they often lack the necessary compliance 
and enforcement measures to effectively promote and implement CSR values. Moreover, 
there is always the risk that corporations may pursue voluntary initiatives in the CSR area 
for strategic reasons only.
288
 Interestingly, this issue has become particularly significant 
in the context of the EPs as critics focus on the inherent non-binding nature of the 
principles to argue that they may not be enough to achieve responsible corporate conduct 
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in practice.
289
 Moreover, many member banks have been criticized for lacking 
transparency and accountability in their compliance with the EPs. In fact, commentators 
note that many of the same NGOs that initially supported the development of the EPs 
have now turned into some of the member banks’ harshest critics.290  
These concerns are covered extensively in the EPs related scholarship. 
Richardson points out, for example, that skepticism continues to surround the EPs 
because of the lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability in the way they are 
adopted and implemented. More specifically, Richardson notes that the EPs do not 
provide a forum for interested persons to assess EPs compliance by member banks.
291
 
Along these lines, Hardenbrook points out that particularly problematic is the fact that the 
EPs do not prescribe procedural requirements in this area.
292
 As a result of this, it can be 
argued that the EPs provide no way for interested groups to challenge member banks’ 
decision making and disclosures, and that there is no mechanism to challenge a project 
categorization that is deficient.
293
  
As noted above, the EPs leave it to member banks to categorize new potential 
projects as either Category A, B or C, depending on their expected negative social and 
environmental impacts.
294
 However, on this point, Richardson states that, although 
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environmental legislation would typically allow interested persons to review and 
challenge this kind of “threshold decision,” the EPs provide no methodology for 
certifying that a project meets the EPs’ criteria and there is no process in place to certify 
compliance with the categorization process.
295
  
An interrelated area of concern is the issue of enforceability. Each bank that 
adopts the EPs voluntarily commits to developing internal policies and processes to 
implement the EPs’ requirements. However, beyond this voluntary commitment, the 
requirement for member banks to implement the EPs is not clear.
296
 Hardenbrook points 
out that the EPs specifically disavow liability for member banks so it is up to each 
member bank to perform its own due diligence on a project and enforce compliance with 
the EPs where necessary.
297
 Hardenbrook notes that the result of this is that the EPs do 
not provide for any recourse against a bank that adopts the EPs in name only and fails to 
implement any of the requirements.
298
 Similarly, Lawrence and Thomas argue that 
member banks have agreed to a set of principles that  
“purport to guide their lending decisions, but those principles are only 
guidelines for internal procedures that no outside person has a right to 
enforce. Accordingly, signatories can legitimately argue, with respect to 
any lending decision, that their internal policies and procedures do not 
require them to comply with the Equator Principles, the PPAH, or the 
safeguard policies in a particular case or under particular 
circumstances.”299   
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These issues have now given rise to the so-called “free-rider” problem.300 The 
free-rider problem arises in the context of the EPs because, as discussed above, no formal 
procedural or enforcement mechanisms exist to monitor the practices of individual 
member banks. This means that all banks are likely to gain some reputational benefits by 
adopting the EPs even if they do not implement all (or any) of the EPs’ requirements.301 
The free-rider concept is not necessarily specific to the EPs as Amalric notes that a 
“general problem of industry self-regulation is to ensure that all actors in the industry 
abide by the voluntary regulation,” and this may be a relevant (although not exclusive) 
problem to the case of the EPs because of the lack of any structure to oversee 
implementation.
302
 However, it is also important to point out that other commentators 
have expressed concern that the problem may be particularly pronounced in the case of 
the EPs because some banks may adopt the principles precisely because of the free-rider 
benefits without any intention of actually complying with principles.
303
  
Finally, Conley and Williams argue that one of the most observable 
manifestations of the free-rider problem arises because of the lack of established full 
disclosure requirements: the EPs’ require only cumulative disclosure reports and nothing 
about individual projects.
304
 As will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis in the context 
of Canadian banks’ EPs disclosure practices, this makes it virtually impossible to 
                                                 
300
 Hardenbrook, supra note 199 at 210. 
 
301
 See e.g., Wright and Rwabizambuga, supra note 131 at 91. 
 
302
 Amalric, supra note 188 at 3-4. 
 
303
 Nguyen, supra note 221 at 21.
 
See also Wright and Rwabizambuga, supra note 131 at 91 (discussing the 
free-rider problem in terms of adverse selection: banks may join the EPs to claim the benefits of enhanced 
reputation with no intention of implementing the EPs’ requirements) 
 
304
 Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 564. 
 
85 
 
 
determine if an individual bank is complying with the EPs’ standards on a project by 
project basis. As a result, commentators argue that, without more information in this area, 
it can be difficult to measure whether free-riding actually does occur for any given bank 
or on any given project.
305
 Ultimately, as will be discussed later in Chapters 6 and 7 of 
this thesis, this is also problematic in the context of trying to assess the overall 
effectiveness of the EPs: it makes it virtually impossible to measure whether the 
principles have achieved positive social and environmental outcomes in practice.
306
  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
As discussed above, this thesis proceeds on the basis that the EPs offer the chance 
to study CSR and, more specifically, the business case for CSR, because of the way they 
propose to merge CSR values with the business goals of member banks. It is well 
established in the EPs scholarship that member banks see the principles as good for 
business in that they serve to reduce certain credit and reputational risks inherent in 
project financing. Some scholars go so far as to argue that further development of CSR 
may in fact depend on these types of initiatives and, in the case of the banking sector 
specifically, the willingness of banks to continue to adopt and adhere to the EPs.
307
  
However, scholars in this area also point out that the value of the EPs as a 
workable CSR model will depend on how they are implemented and that the quality of 
implementation in turn depends on accountability, transparency and enforceability.
308
 In 
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this regard, some commentators point to the problems discussed in Section 5.3 above to 
argue that a specific standard of review should now be established to deter the free-rider 
problem and to provide a way for determining whether a specific project has met the EPs’ 
requirements.
309
 Although mandatory requirements are unlikely in the short-term, it is 
submitted here that something clearly needs to be done to address the concerns 
surrounding EPs compliance and disclosure by member banks. Commentators in this area 
have already acknowledged that free-riding could pose a substantial threat to the survival 
of the EPs because it clearly weakens the legitimacy of the principles.
310
 They note that 
this would be particularly true if the practice becomes a trend in the banking 
community.
311 
Ultimately, as discussed in the following Chapters of this thesis, this result 
could serve to provide NGOs with justification for their argument that EPs compliance 
should be a legal requirement and that member banks should be subject to independent 
monitoring and enforcement.
312
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Chapter 6 - The Role of the EPs in Canadian Banking  
This Chapter tests the relevance of the EPs in Canada by reviewing the EPs 
related public disclosure of key Canadian banks. It considers the incentives for EPs 
adoption in Canada and also considers whether Canadian banks are adequately reporting 
their EPs compliance practices. The goal is to determine how far (if at all) the EPs have 
become embedded in Canadian banking. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, at the 
time of writing, seven major Canadian financial institutions have signed on to the EPs, 
including Royal Bank of Canada (RBC); Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD); Bank of Nova 
Scotia (BNS); Bank of Montreal (BMO); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC); 
Export Development Canada; and Manulife Financial.
313
 The primary focus of this study 
is on the EPs disclosures of Canada’s five largest banks (referred to in this thesis as the 
“Big-5” Canadian banks), RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and CIBC, during the period 2008 - 
2012. The Big-5 Canadian banks are recognized as leaders among Canadian banks, so 
although this study only looks in detail at them, the findings should be attributable to the 
Canadian baking sector more generally.
314
  
The methodology for this research was adopted from a similar study conducted by 
Macve and Chen of EPs disclosures by Barclays and HSBC in the U.K.
315
 The authors 
noted in their paper that the EPs provide an interesting institutional arena for analyzing 
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how banks are implementing CSR but noted that there remains a need for further research 
to investigate actual practice and how this varies over time.
316
 The instant research will 
respond to this call for further study from the Canadian perspective by considering the 
following questions: 
1. What are the motivations for adopting and adhering to the EPs in Canada? 
2. Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible? 
3. How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking? 
 
6.1 EPs Disclosure by Canadian Banks 
Under Principle 10 of the EPs, each member bank is required to report annually 
about its EPs implementation processes and experience:  
Principle 10: EPFI Reporting 
 
Each EPFI adopting the Equator Principles commits to report publicly 
at least annually about its Equator Principles implementation 
processes and experience, taking into account appropriate 
confidentiality considerations.
317
 
 
The footnote to Principle 10 states that the reporting should include (as a 
minimum) the number of transactions screened by each bank and the categorization 
accorded to each transaction. It appears optional under Principle 10 for the banks to also 
provide a breakdown by business sector or geographic region and other “information 
regarding implementation.”318 A reporting best practices guide is available to banks, but 
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it is not a required reporting frame-work and offers only guidance to assist banks in the 
development of their own reporting methodologies.
319
  
As noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Canadian banks with equity of more than one 
billion Canadian dollars are required by section 459.3 of the Bank Act to “. . . annually 
publish a statement describing the contribution of the bank and its prescribed affiliates to 
the Canadian economy and society.”320 As such, large Canadian banks, each of the Big-5 
Canadian banks included, typically build on the contents of this annual reporting 
requirement to create their overall CSR reporting (for ease of reference, the reports in this 
area are generally referred to below as the “CSR Reports” for each bank studied). Each 
bank also sets out their EPs disclosure as required under Principle 10 within the 
“environmental” or “responsible lending” sections of their CSR Reports or on other CSR 
related sections of their websites.
321
  
The results of the EPs reporting for each of RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and CIBC 
during the period 2008 - 2012 are set out in the following Table 1: 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Project type 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Equator 
Principles 
Category A 
0 0 1 0 0 
Equator 
Principles 
Category B 
9 13 4 5 3 
Equator 
Principles 
Category C 
1 2 2 1 2 
Total Projects 10 15 7 6 5 
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 Source: RBC’s 2012, 2011 and 2008 CSR Reports, available online at: 
http://www.rbc.com/community-sustainability/reporting-performance.html 
 
TD Bank and Trust 
Project type 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Equator 
Principles 
Category A 
0 0 0 0 0 
Equator 
Principles 
Category B 
0 0 2 1 7 
Equator 
Principles 
Category C 
12 8 3 0 4 
Total Projects 12 8 5 1 11 
 Source: TD’s 2012 and 2011 CSR Reports, available online at:   
http://www.td.com/corporate-responsibility/report-centre/index.jsp.  
 
Bank of Montreal 
Project type 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Equator 
Principles 
Category A 
Not published 0 0 0 0 
Equator 
Principles 
Category B 
Not published 2 5 0 1 
Equator 
Principles 
Category C 
Not published 0 0 1 1 
Total Projects N/a 2 5 1 2 
 Source: BMO Website – Responsible Lending Website, available online at:   
http://www.bmo.com/home/about/banking/corporate-
responsibility/customers/responsible-lending --  
 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
Project type 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Equator 
Principles 
Category A 
3 0 1 0 1 
Equator 
Principles 
Category B 
7 4 7 1 6 
Equator 
Principles 
Category C 
5 10 8 3 3 
Total Projects 15 14 16 4 10 
 Source: BNS’s 2008 – 2012 CSR Reports, available online at:   
http://www.scotiabank.com/ca/en/0,,2590,00.html 
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Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
Project type 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Equator 
Principles 
Category A 
0 0 1 0 0 
Equator 
Principles 
Category B 
12 1 3 0 0 
Equator 
Principles 
Category C 
5 7 3 0 0 
Total Projects 17 8 7 0 0 
 Source: CIBC’s 2008 – 2012 CSR Reports, available online at:   
https://www.cibc.com/ca/cibc-and-you/public-account.html  
 
6.2 Analysis 
(a) What are the motivations for adopting the EPs in Canada? 
As discussed in Section 5.1 of this thesis, the literature points to NGO pressure, 
credit risk mitigation and reputational risk management as the leading factors in the 
creation and adoption of the EPs.
322
 As might be expected, given that Canada is a western 
country with relatively vibrant public policy and corporate regulatory systems, Wright 
and Rwabizambuga’s analysis of global EPs adoption patterns matches up well in the 
Canadian market: each of the Big-5 Canadian banks has formally adopted the EPs so it is 
uncontroversial to say that the principles are now well accepted in Canadian banking.
323
   
Interestingly, however, despite the wide-spread adoption of the EPs in Canada, 
Canadian banks do not at present have extensive project financing activities that are 
subject to the EPs’ requirements. The results of this study (contained in the tables above) 
show that Canadian banks engaged in only a small number of project finance transactions 
that were subject to the EPs during the period 2008 - 2012: RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and 
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CIBC had on average only 36 EPs project finance deals per year between them during the 
five year period studied. By way of comparison, Macve and Chen identified that Barclays 
alone had 54 EPs project finance deals in 2007.
324
 This result suggests that Canadian 
banks are primarily interested in the reputational benefits of EPs adoption, since the 
incentive to manage credit risk in project financing is not, practically speaking, present. 
As noted above, a bank can adopt the EPs by simply issuing a press release stating its 
intention to follow the rules and there is no official organizational body that certifies or 
monitors EPs adoption or implementation – meaning that any bank can choose to adopt 
the EPs and benefit from the associated reputational benefits.
325
 
TD provides an example of this issue. In terms of TD’s motivations for adopting 
the EPs, the Bank states in its 2011 CSR Report that it adopted the EPs in 2007 as part of 
its “wider credit risk management process.”326 Taken on its face, this statement indicates 
that TD was motivated primarily by the credit risk management advantages offered by 
the principles. However, upon further review, it is more likely that TD uses the EPs for 
their reputational benefits in these areas: TD is primarily a retail bank, with 80% of its 
total financing based on personal and residential lending in North America.
327
 Moreover, 
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TD itself confirms that only 5 percent of the bank’s total financing activities involve 
clients operating in environmentally and socially sensitive industries.
328
  
Under the EPs incentive theories canvassed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, an 
argument can therefore be made that TD falls into the category of a retail bank with 
significant exposure to NGO activism and reputational issues. This finding is also 
consistent with TD’s other broad statements and CSR commitments concerning its 
lending practices. It is observed that each of these statements is related to recent high 
profile environmental and social issues, suggesting that TD is particularly sensitive to 
public awareness and attention in these areas. For example, TD states that it “does not 
lend money for transactions that would involve activities within World Heritage sites, 
would result in the degradation of protected critical natural habitats as designated 
according to World Conservation Union classification or would involve the purchase of 
timber from illegal logging operations.”329 Moreover, TD states that it does not lend 
money for “transactions that are directly related to the trade in or manufacturing of 
material for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or for land mines or cluster 
bombs.”330  
This research found similar results across the remaining Big-5 Canadian banks as 
each of the banks studied also includes broad self-serving statements about the EPs in 
their CSR Reports and on-line. For example, BMO sets out its EPs disclosure in the 
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broader “Responsible Lending” section of the BMO website, which includes the 
following broad statements: 
“[A]s lenders, we use sound risk management practices to identify, 
evaluate and mitigate to the extent practical the environmental impacts on 
credit facilities provided. It is BMO’s intent to avoid dealing with 
borrowers who have poor environmental risk management track records. 
… Environmental risk is one of many factors considered during the credit 
assessment process that results in the decision to accept or reject a loan 
application. All eligible borrowers for commercial and corporate loans are 
subject to our environmental risk assessment process.”331 
 
However, of the Big-5 Canadian banks studied, BMO had the lowest number of 
EPs related project finance deals, with only 10 such transactions disclosed during the 
2008 - 2012 period. Further, BMO confirms that, to date, all of its projects financed 
under the EPs have been in North America.
332
 Similarly, despite a relatively small 
number of EPs deals, RBC notes that it was the first Canadian bank to adopt the EPs in 
2003, and that this step enhanced the bank’s “existing environmental risk management 
policies and commitment to sustainable development.”333 RBC also mentions that it “will 
provide loans only to those projects that can demonstrate to our satisfaction that key 
social and environmental issues have been addressed in accordance with our policies and 
processes.”334 CIBC cites “[p]rogress towards the adoption of the Equator Principles” as 
an area in which CIBC has made a “number of advances toward achieving its goal of 
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promoting sustainability and protecting the environment.”335 BNS identifies its adoption 
of the EPs as one of its “key achievements” in the area of CSR and cites the principles as 
an example of the way the bank “evaluates environmental factors as part of our lending 
and investment decisions.”336  
These results show that Canadian banks are using the EPs as examples of their 
public commitments to CSR and sustainability despite the fact that they have reported 
only a small number of cases in which they have used the principles in practice. 
Moreover, as discussed below in Section 6.2(b) of this thesis, Canadian banks fail to 
provide any meaningful disclosure surrounding their implementation of the EPs or the 
extent to which they are applying the principles within their businesses. Taken together, 
these findings reinforce the finding that Canadian banks are currently using the EPs 
primarily for the important reputational benefits they offer.   
 
(b) Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible?  
The results of this study show that the EPs reporting and disclosure by Canadian 
banks is limited. Although each bank claims to attach great importance to the EPs (see 
Section 6.2(a) of this thesis), their disclosure fails to go much beyond the bare minimum 
required by Principle 10. Notably absent from Canadian banks’ EPs reporting, for 
example, are relevant details concerning project information and the results (if any) of the 
banks’ EPs analysis and implementation. This makes it impossible to determine whether 
                                                 
335
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EPs adoption in Canada is having an impact on social and environmental outcomes and, 
more generally, provides additional evidence to support the conclusion that Canadian 
banks are primarily interested in the reputational benefits of EPs adoption.  
It should be noted, however, that some of the Canadian banks studied do take the 
additional and optional step of providing general geographic and market sector 
breakdowns of their EPs projects (a step that is only optionally required under Principle 
10 of the EPs). For example, RBC segments its EPs reporting by geographic region, 
distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries. RBC also provides general 
industry sector categories as follows: Energy (non-renewable); Energy (renewable) and 
Infrastructure.
337
 TD segments its EPs reporting by country and specific market sectors 
(e.g. “Oil and gas extraction” and “Real estate”).338 However, TD also notes that all of its 
EPs projects were located in North America during the period 2008 - 2012.
339
 Similarly, 
BMO confirms that all its EPs projects to date have been in North America, but it does 
not provide market sector specific information.
340
 CIBC segments its reporting between 
“Within Canada and the U.S.” and “Outside Canada and the U.S.”341 However, unlike TD 
and BMO, CIBC reports that it does have projects taking place outside of Canada and the 
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U.S., with 6 such projects disclosed in 2012.
342
 BNS provides a breakdown of its EPs 
projects on a percentage basis by country. Interestingly, BNS does appear to have some 
international project financing activity as it lists Mexico and South America as two of its 
geographic categories. In 2008, for example, BNS reported that 30 percent of its EPs 
projects were located in these jurisdictions.
343
 BNS has subsequently grouped these two 
reporting areas into a category defined as “Latin America” and reported that 20 percent of 
its EPs projects were located in that area in 2012.
344
 However, BNS does not provide an 
industry sector breakdown and offers no explanation for this omission.  
This is the extent of Canadian banks’ EPs reporting and, as a result, this area 
should emerge as an obvious area of concern. This result is also consistent with the 
findings of Macve and Chen who concluded in their study that general and self-serving 
statements about the EPs do “not seem very helpful for readers who want to know about 
the impact of EP.”345 Further, these results are consistent with the academic commentary 
canvassed in Section 5.3 of this thesis that has identified the lack of transparency and 
accountability in EPs compliance as significant areas of concern.
346
 For example, 
Richardson’s conclusion in the Canadian context is on point:   
“there is little evidence that Canadian banks pay careful attention to the 
long-term environmental performance of borrowers. Indeed, Canadian 
banks have been publicly criticized for not being more open about the 
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social and environmental aspects and effects of their financing. … While 
the Canadian Bankers Association (“CBA”) has made public relations 
statements about the environment and banking, apart from the usual self-
interested statements about protecting banks from environmental liability, 
the CBA’s contributions have been rather brief and superficial.”347 
 
(c) How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking? 
There is anecdotal market evidence to show that the EPs are becoming embedded 
in Canadian banks’ decision making. Canadian business law firm McCarthy Tétrault LLP 
notes, for example, that the EPs provide a framework for assessing and managing social 
and environmental risks in projects across industry sectors in Canada, including energy, 
mining, oil and gas, and infrastructure projects.
348
 Similarly, other Canadian observers 
have commented that the EPs are not only seen as a benchmark in project finance in 
Canada, but are being used more widely in other areas of banking as well.
349
 McCarthy’s 
concludes on this point that that the “standards of the EPs for identifying and managing 
the credit risks inherent to project financing uniformly across the financial sector are 
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perceived as mitigating risks of default, and so should be directly related to the banks’ 
financial interests in all industry sectors.”350 
It is important to point out, however, that some of the claims regarding the impact 
of the EPs are based on the still unproven argument that, because project finance 
typically involves syndicated loans, the presence of an EPs bank should cause the non-
member banks of the syndicate to either raise their review processes to a level closer to 
compliance with the EPs or otherwise benefit from the greater level of oversight required 
by the EPs.
351
 Amalric notes on this point, for example, that project finance often requires 
loan syndications whereby a lead arranger brings together a group of banks to provide 
financing for a project. If, as in the case of the EPs, “a sufficiently large group of banks 
adopts a new standard, leading arrangers may find it difficult to get a deal through that 
does not conform to this standard. The costs of arranging a deal without the participation 
of banks having adopted it will increase and may supersede the costs of abiding by the 
standard. If this is the case, leading arrangers will decide to adopt the new standard, and 
de facto all lenders will also abide by it.”352 However, Freshfields cautions against 
unrealistic expectations in this area given the structure of project financing arrangements. 
Ultimately, Freshfields argues that the potential leverage of lenders over borrowers’ 
environmental performance may be limited because EPs banks may not get involved in a 
syndicated project financing deal until late in the game when basic project choices and 
design decisions have already been made and agreed to.
353
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Another way to determine the impact of the EPs is to consider the extent to which 
the principles are becoming embedded in the internal policies and procedures of member 
banks.
354
 On this point, there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that Canadian 
banks involved in project finance (domestically or abroad) may be using the EPs as an 
informal internal standard to determine if a transaction is well managed from both a 
credit risk and a reputational viewpoint.
355
Consistent with this, BNS notes that it has a 
“comprehensive set of tools and guidance documents to help ensure banking and credit 
officers have the necessary information to meet the Equator Principles requirements.”356 
BNS also maintains that it reinforces its commitment to the EPs by providing employees 
with training on how to “[i]ncorporate the principles into their work.”357 Similarly, RBC 
states that it employs its own “Enterprise-wide ESRM Policy,” under which it considers 
the impact of environmental and social factors in all of its activities, not just financing. 
RBC also states that the bank screens all of its debt and equity underwriting activities, 
and corporate credit facilities, for environmental and social risk, regardless of whether the 
use of proceeds is known. Under these broader policies, RBC claims that it performed 
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detailed environmental credit risk assessments on over 1,100 transactions in Canada and 
the U.S. in 2011.
358
  
Interestingly, TD appears to be taking EPs implementation a step further in this 
area, formally stating in its 2011 CSR Report that it has “fully embedded the principles 
within its credit risk management policy applied to all undertakings including general 
corporate purpose, project and fixed-asset financing.”359 TD claims that this will “ensure 
that they are applied to all forms of lending – not just project finance. This progressive 
and proactive step ensures that all transactions receive a consistent review, and we 
believe it reflects the direction toward which the Equator Principles should be 
evolving.”360 TD has now undertaken to update its internal credit risk management 
policy, procedures and sector-specific due diligence guidance documents in 2013 to 
reflect these changes.
361
  
TD is not alone in this regard as commentators suggest in the international context 
that other banks are doing this as well as the EPs “have gradually spilled over into the 
everyday financings of some investment banks.”362 They reference, for example, the 
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website of Morgan Stanley, where that bank states that it has “adopted explicit limitations 
on financing or investing in projects that would, among other things: significantly 
degrade a critical habitat; support companies engaged in illegal logging; support 
extraction or logging projects in World Heritage sites; or violate local and World Bank 
pollution standards.”363 Similarly, Macve and Chen note that Barclays has stated that it 
also applied the “spirit” of the EPs to 268 non-project finance deals in 2006.364 
 
6.3 Conclusion   
Macve and Chen concluded in their U.K. study of EPs adoption that the EPs have 
been among the most successful of the many initiatives relating to corporate social and 
environmental performance.
365
 They further concluded that the EPs operate as “soft law” 
in the regulatory space between individual voluntary action and legally mandated 
regulation and that this provides an example of the business case for CSR.
366
 However, 
the authors also note that any social or environmental benefits of the EPs should be 
viewed primarily as a “by-product” of banks’ risk management processes rather than their 
main objective.
367
 To put it another way, the authors argue that promotion of CSR values 
is “primarily an advantageous outcome rather than the core objective for banks signing 
up to EP.”368 Overall, they noted that the EPs disclosures by Barclays and HSBC remain 
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too “highly summarized for outsiders to know how EP has impacted on individual 
decisions.”369 Macve and Chen also note that concerns about free-riding arise in this 
context because any bank “who joined the “club” could gain some reputational benefits 
from merely announcing that, regardless of their true compliance.”370 
The results of this Chapter show that many of these issues apply in the Canadian 
context. Canadian banks do not at present have extensive EPs project financing activities 
so the EPs’ high adoption rate in Canada suggests that Canadian banks are primarily 
interested in the important reputational benefits offered by the principles.
371
 This, in turn, 
suggests that Canadian banks view the EPs primarily as a useful public relations tool that 
helps them to substantiate broad self-serving statements about their CSR initiatives. 
Moreover, although Canadian banks claim to attach great importance to the EPs, their 
disclosures fail to go much beyond the bare minimum required by Principle 10. Notably 
absent from Canadian EPs reporting, are relevant details concerning project information 
and the results (if any) of the banks’ EPs analysis. These findings therefore reinforce 
existing criticisms of Canadian banks in this area and demonstrate the lack of 
transparency surrounding the social and environmental effects of their financings. 
Despite this, this research did uncover some positive trends in the EPs practices of 
Canadian banks and these should merit further study. For example, although it is 
premature to draw any conclusions in this area, it is submitted here that the commitment 
by TD and other banks to implement the EPs within their broader businesses may provide 
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preliminary support for the social context styles of regulation discussed in Chapter 5. For 
example, TD may be in the process of engaging in its own “internal reflection” about 
what form EPs compliance should take and this provides a practical example of the 
“reflexive” and “soft law” styles of regulation discussed in Section 5.2 of this thesis. 
Moreover, as Conley and Williams argue, this sort of behavior may act as a catalyst for 
cultural change within the bank.
372
 Although likely to be more controversial, these 
developments may also provide early support for the psychological theory of CSR 
regulation advocated by Rupp and Williams.
373
 Under this theory, for example, the 
results of this study suggest that TD may be in the early stages of a gradual shift toward 
“internalization of environmental and social values,” thereby evidencing what Rupp and 
Williams argue is a commitment to ethical norms that are beyond the minimum 
requirements of the EPs.
374
   
These results may also be indicative of changes in the broader banking industry. 
On this point, for example, Rupp and Williams point to the wide-spread adoption of the 
EPs to argue that this could provide evidence of a change within the banking sector 
generally, and that this may represent the beginnings of social and environmental 
regulation of global business by the leading EPs banks.
375
 They point out that, like TD, 
there is some evidence that international banks have begun to apply the EPs to social and 
environmental standards for sustainable banking across product categories, including 
                                                 
372
 Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 546. 
 
373
 Rupp and Williams, supra note 8. 
 
374
 Ibid at 598. 
 
375
 Ibid. See also Wiley, supra note 362. 
 
105 
 
 
underwriting, commercial lending, and retail banking, and across industries.
376
 
Ultimately, Rupp and Williams refer to this development as the “contagion” effects of the 
EPs: observed examples of the principles being used as a benchmark for setting up social 
and environmental standards for other financial practices within the banks (i.e., not 
limited to just project finance itself).
377
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
7.1 Conclusions and Further Study 
The research proposition for this thesis was that Canadian banks are 
demonstrating CSR behavior through the steps they are taking to implement and comply 
with the EPs. The results of this study provide initial support for this proposition: each of 
the Big-5 Canadian banks issues an annual CSR Report and provides for EPs related 
disclosure either in their CSR Reports or on other CSR related sections of their websites. 
Moreover, each of the banks claims to attach great importance to the EPs and rely on the 
principles as an example of their broader public commitments to CSR. There can be little 
doubt that these findings provide practical support from the Canadian perspective for the 
argument that a shift of business and financial values is occurring leading toward greater 
importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the banking sector.  
However, this conclusion is tempered by the general finding in this thesis that 
banks use the EPs primarily for self-interested reasons. As noted in Chapter 5, the EPs 
related scholarship identifies that banks adopt the EPs primarily because there are 
significant business incentives to do so. In short, the EPs are “good for business,” 
particularly as tools to manage (i) the credit risk inherent in global project financing; and 
(ii) the reputational risk associated with the large scale infrastructure projects in socially 
and environmentally sensitive areas. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, these motives 
for EPs adoption are held to be instrumental, in that they are focused on the means for the 
participating banks to advance their own interests.  
This is not necessarily inconsistent with CSR to the extent that the business case 
for CSR contemplates self-interested business motivations as being a primary driver of 
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corporate activity. As a result, this study also confirms the approach of scholars who have 
studied the EPs in the context of the business case for CSR. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
scholars have established the business case or “value add” of the EPs through their 
enhanced mitigation of credit and reputational risks, thereby increasing EPs banks’ 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis non adopters. However, the business case for CSR also 
requires integration of business incentives with social and environmental concerns. On 
this point, it is submitted here that, while the EPs are evidently “good for business,” there 
is no clear indication that they have resulted in positive social or environmental 
outcomes.
378
 Further, as discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of full disclosure and adequate 
reporting in this area remains a serious area of concern as it is virtually impossible to 
substantiate any claims about the positive impact of the EPs in practice.
379
 
In the Canadian context specifically, the results of this study show that Canadian 
banks adopt the EPs primarily for the important reputational benefits the principles offer: 
Canadian banks do not currently have significant EPs related project financing activities  
so the incentive to manage credit risk is not, practically speaking, present. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, this finding leads to obvious questions surrounding the legitimacy of claims 
about the importance of EPs adoption as part of Canadian banks’ overall “responsible 
lending” and credit risk management initiatives.380 Moreover, each of the Canadian banks 
studied makes broad self-serving statements about the value of their commitments to the 
                                                 
378
 See e.g., Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 569 (noting that there is no consensus on “whether the 
EPs are making a substantial tangible difference on the ground, in the local communities they are intended 
to benefit.”) 
  
379
 See e.g., Macve and Chen, supra note 6 at 906.  
 
380
 See Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this thesis. 
 
108 
 
 
EPs. However, despite these claims, this study shows that the EPs disclosure by Canadian 
banks generally fails to go much beyond the bare minimum required by Principle 10.  
As noted in Chapter 6, these results reinforce the existing criticisms of EPs banks 
canvassed in Chapter 5: lack of transparency (the EPs do not mandate procedural 
mechanisms for reviewing and monitoring compliance) and accountability (the EPs do 
not include mechanisms to enforce compliance with banks’ voluntary commitments). 
This may ultimately serve to provide NGOs with further support for their argument that 
EPs compliance should be made into a legal requirement.
381
 Several writers have 
addressed these issues by offering suggested improvements to the EPs reporting 
framework and significant further study will be required in this area.
382
 Hardenbrook 
argues, for example, that one way to determine whether the EPs impact banking decisions 
would be to examine the policies and procedures that banks have implemented to meet 
the EPs’ standards.383 As another possibility, Hardenbrook notes it would be helpful to 
examine whether there have been any changes in loan covenants to reflect the EPs’ 
requirements. Hardenbrook argues that this might be the most important indication of a 
bank’s commitment to the EPs, because it gives direct legal redress if the borrower fails 
to fully comply.
384
 However, Hardenbrook concedes that this information would be 
difficult to obtain on a broad scale because of the confidentiality of loan agreements and 
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the fact that banks typically do not disclose information regarding specific projects that 
have been turned down for their failure to meet the EPs’ standards.385  
As noted in Chapter 5, there is also on-going debate in this area surrounding the 
issue of enforceability: whether the EPs are sufficient as a voluntary code or whether 
more mandatory requirements are needed.
386
 Commentators have already noted, for 
example, that there is the potential for the EPs to evolve into a compulsory requirement, 
possibly in the form of an international treaty.
387
 Similarly, other writers have considered 
this issue in the context of whether EPs banks may be sued for violation of the EPs’ 
standards, or for fraud or false advertising for failing to comply with the principles.
388
 
These developments will support calls from NGOs who argue that mandatory 
requirements should now be established to deter the free-rider problem and to allow a 
uniform way of enforcing the EPs.
389
  
However, other commentators note that the principles have been successful to-
date primarily because they promote wider adoption rates as a voluntary initiative.
390
  
Similarly, commentators note that, in resisting calls for a mandatory independent system, 
EPs banks argue that the high level of public scrutiny and media attention in this area 
ensures that breaches in compliance will be exposed.
391
 However, it is submitted here that 
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it remains unclear how “public scrutiny and media attention” are to be effective in 
ensuring compliance if banks fail to adequately disclose and report on their EPs activities 
in the first place. On this point, in their recent survey of international EPs reporting, 
lawyers Christopher Langdon and Claudia O’Brien of the international law firm Latham 
& Watkins LLP, confirmed that EPs underreporting by member banks is a “legitimate 
practical concern.”392 They noted that, while all banks in their study reported the number 
of EPs projects, few described the role the EPs play in decision-making processes making 
it difficult to assess the EPs’ overall impact.393  
Ultimately, this thesis shows that many of these issues arise in the Canadian 
context. The findings in Chapter 6 show that there is clearly room for improvement for 
Canadian banks, particularly in the areas of EPs reporting and disclosure, and further 
study will be needed to see if Canadian banks are mindful of these concerns as they move 
forward in their EPs implementation and other CSR programs. It will also be interesting 
to see if Canadian banks move toward limiting their use of vague self-serving statements 
about the EPs in order to avoid being labeled with the free-rider and other associated 
problems discussed in Chapter 5. As noted above, concerns about free-riding arise in the 
context of the EPs because no formal mechanisms exist to screen or monitor the practices 
of adopting banks, meaning that all adopters are likely to gain some reputational benefits 
irrespective of their actual compliance practices. Developments in this area should be 
                                                 
392
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monitored closely as some commentators have already concluded that free-riding could 
pose a substantial threat to the EPs if the practice becomes a trend in the banking sector. 
One positive (and somewhat surprising) development identified in Chapter 6 is 
the decision by TD to adopt the EPs more generally into its broader commercial lending 
activities. As discussed in Section 6.3 of this thesis, and although further study will be 
needed to monitor TD’s success in implementing this initiative, this result is interesting in 
that it may provide early practical evidence to support the developing CSR scholarship in 
this area canvassed in Chapter 5.
394
 Moreover, this finding provides further evidence in 
support of the trend identified in this thesis as a shift of business and financial values 
toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the financial sector.  
Importantly, the TD case also provides evidence of a step forward in the 
important area of EPs scope expansion (the idea that banks should use the EPs beyond 
project finance transactions). In its recent submissions to the EPs Association on the 
development of EP III, for example, BankTrack stated that scope expansion is the most 
important area of improvement needed for the EPs to achieve their full potential.
395
 Also 
interesting are TD’s broader statements about its refusal to lend money for transactions 
that would involve the degradation of internationally protected habitats, the purchase of 
timber from illegal logging operations or the trade in or manufacturing of material for 
prohibited weapons.
396
 Subject to concerns expressed above surrounding free-riding and 
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the accuracy of this reporting, this result appears to show explicit private sector 
endorsement of public international treaties, and scholars are already considering 
implications for further study on these issues.
397
  
In addition to developments in the Canadian context, there will be a number of 
opportunities for further study in the context of the EPs internationally. For example, 
further study will be needed to see if continuing geopolitical shifts result in changes to 
the EPs adoption patterns currently identified by Wright and Rwabizambuga as being 
primarily concentrated in Western European and North American banks.
398
 On this point, 
it is interesting that at the time of writing only one Chinese bank, Industrial Bank Co., 
Ltd, is listed among member banks.
399
 However, with the increased media and public 
criticism of banks in China, Langdon and O’Brien note that it remains to be seen whether 
more Chinese banks will adopt the EPs to take advantage of reputational benefits.
400
 They 
cite unidentified sources as stating that government bodies in China have improved their 
environmental standards in response to the EPs: 
 “[o]ne source says that the Chinese banking regulator in 2007 improved 
its standards with help from the international banking community, because 
of increased scrutiny of Chinese activity in Africa. Another states that the 
Chinese equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency introduced 
the principles into its green credit policy after criticism from the World 
Bank president, and has actually withheld loans from companies that 
violated the environmental rules. This shows that the principles can carry 
powerful force even outside of the private project finance sector.” 401 
                                                 
397
 See, e.g., N. A. Affolder, “The Private Life of Environmental Treaties” (2008), electronic copy available 
online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502948.  
 
398
 See Section 5.1 of this thesis. 
 
399
 See online at: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/members-reporting (accessed as of June 28, 
2013).  
 
400
 See Langdon and O’Brien, supra note 392 at 34.  
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Beyond China, the EPs do appear to be making inroads into other areas of the 
globe, with 5 banks from South Africa having signed on,
402
 and several Latin American 
adopters as well.
403
 Notably underrepresented, however, are banks from Eastern 
European states, Russia, Asia and the Middle East.
404
 One possible area of concern that 
could be relevant here is that the EPs Association may not want to broaden membership 
to admit new members from emerging markets that do not have the resources to comply 
with the principles.
405
 Although likely to be controversial, this explanation for the 
primarily western adoption patterns should be studied as well.  
Several authors have also identified the need for further case studies into 
individual EPs projects and specific industries to see how the principles are working on 
the ground. Langdon and O’Brien’s recent study goes some way to addressing this need 
in the mining context; arguing, by way of reference to global mining companies’ 
endorsement of the EPs, that  
“poor reporting does not necessarily reflect poor implementation of the 
principles on the ground. On the contrary, a case study of the mining and 
metals industry, where project finance is frequently used, illustrates how 
the principles have an impact beyond what the bank reports suggest. 
                                                 
402
 The list of member banks on the EPs website can be sorted by region and country, available online at: 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/members-reporting/members-and-reporting (accessed as of 
June 28, 2013). As of the date of writing, the South African banks are Absa Bank Limited, FirstRand 
Limited, NedBank Limited and Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. Other African countries 
represented are Egypt (1), Mauritius (1), Morocco (1), Nigeria (2) and Togo (1). 
 
403
 Ibid. As of the date of writing, these include banks in Argentina (1), Brazil (5), Chile (1), Columbia (1), 
Costa Rica (1), Peru (1) and Uruguay (1).   
 
404
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405
 See Langdon and O’Brien, supra note 392 at 33. The authors argue that EPs Association’s response to 
this problem suggests that they “genuinely strive to implement the principles and do not want new 
members to dilute the Equator brand by noncompliance.” There is, however, no supporting evidence 
offered for this position.  
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Evidence from the industry suggests that the principles do have bite, and 
that they have influenced mining projects around the globe.”406  
 
This methodology could easily be extended, for example, to Canada, where it is 
argued that the EPs, together with other international frameworks, may have already 
evolved to address many of the CSR related issues in the extractive industry.
407
  
Finally, the EPs’ impact on the practice of banking lawyers should be studied. 
Some practicing lawyers have already commented that, depending on one’s point of 
view, the EPs can be either a lawyer’s dream or nightmare: they “vastly expand the scope 
of requirements to which borrowers agree to be subject, to include not only those 
required by law, but also the standards of … the safeguard guidelines, and any project-
specific procedures specified in the EMP.”408 However, they note that, although the EPs 
appear to provide an important breakthrough in environmental and social issues, a close 
reading of them reveals  
“a set of requirements that is ambiguous at best. They are filled with 
potential “loopholes” that are only made wider and less defined by the 
guidelines which they incorporate by reference. Their value from either 
the lender-signatories’ points of view or those of public skeptics is open to 
significant question because of these uncertainties. In general, for all 
constituencies (or stakeholders), the ambiguity of the Principles presents 
both an opportunity and a risk.”409 
 
 
                                                 
406
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407
 See the discussion on this point by Seck. Seck, supra note 144 at 67-70. See also e.g., the January 19, 
2012 Mining Association of Canada’s report on the “National Roundtables on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries” at 67, electronic copy 
available online at: 
http://www.mining.ca/www/media_lib/MAC_Documents/Final%20MAC%20Roundtables%20Report%20
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7.2 Further Study: EP III 
There will be significant opportunity for further study surrounding the 
implementation of the EP III update in 2013 and 2014. In particular, it will be interesting 
to see how, if it all, the concerns of NGOs and other commentators are addressed. As 
noted in Chapter 4, the EP III update is based on the IFC’s review of the IFC 
Performance Standards and update of its Sustainability Framework, which were re-
launched in January 2012.
410
 A draft of the EP III was released for stakeholder 
consultation and public comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal Stakeholder 
Consultation and Public Comment period closed on October 12, 2012. The EP III update 
has now been launched effective as of June 4, 2013, but subject to a transition period 
ending on December 31, 2013.
411
 The transition period will allow EP II to be applied to 
new transactions (i.e. where the mandate is signed after June 4, 2013) up to the end of the 
transition period.
412
   
As at the date of submission of this thesis, the results of the EP III update remain 
to be seen. In this regard, the EPs Association has identified the following key objectives 
of the EP III update: 
 To ensure the EPs Association members continue to appropriately manage 
environmental and social risk and impacts for their institutions, clients and 
relevant stakeholders with regard to the financing of projects, 
 
 To reflect the recent update of the IFC Performance Standards, and 
 
                                                 
410
 See the IFC website, online at: 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_site/IFC+Sustainabil
ity/Sustainability+Framework  
 
411
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http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3/ep3.  
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 To maintain the level playing field on which international and local financial 
institutions operate, with regards to sustainable financing objectives.
413
 
 
However, NGOs are quick to point out that the EPs Association qualified its 
commitment from the beginning of the update process by stating that “all of these topics 
would require formal amendment to the EPs and/or EP Association Governance Rules 
and a voting process by the entire EPs Association membership - the results of which 
cannot, at the time of this statement, be fully assured.”414 As a result, NGOs continue to 
criticize the EP III update and BankTrack in particular has pointed out that the review 
process took well over two years since the EPs Association’s first announcement of its 
intention to create the EP III in 2010. BankTrack has since confirmed its frustration on 
these issues and has demanded firm commitments from the EPs Association; failing 
which, it argues that the EPs Association will have failed to achieve any meaningful 
improvements with EP III.
415
  
More specifically, critics have identified significant room for improvement in 
three principal areas: scope extension (banks should use the principles for all types of 
commercial financing); transparency (banks should provide full disclosure) and 
accountability (banks should report at the project level and allow for appropriate review 
                                                 
413
 See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (EP III) UPDATE 
[Frequently asked Questions] at 4-5, online at: http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/EPIII_FAQs.pdf  
 
414
 See the “Summary Response by Equator Principles Association to the Equator Principles Strategic 
Review Report” at 4-5, available online at: http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/ep_association_summary_response_strategic_review.pdf.  
 
415
 See online article by Johan Frijns, Director of BankTrack, “Equators Principles III Better be Good” 
March 29, 2012, available online at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/show/news/equator_principles_iii_better_be_good. 
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of project decisions).
416
 The EPs Association, in turn, responded that the EP III would 
address these concerns through three key areas of improvement:  
 An extension in the scope of the EPs to Project-Related Corporate Loans 
and Bridge Loans. 
  
 New requirements related to managing impacts on climate.  
 
 Greater emphasis on human rights considerations in due diligence.  
 
 A strengthening of reporting and transparency requirements.417  
 
More specifically, in terms of scope expansion, the EP III state that coverage will 
be extended to “Project-Related Corporate Loans,” which the EP III define according to 
the following criteria: (i) the majority of the loan is related to a single project; (ii) the 
total aggregate loan amount is at least U.S. $100 million; (iii) the bank’s individual initial 
exposure is at least U.S. $50 million; and (iv) the loan tenor is at least two years.
418
 In 
terms of reporting and transparency, the new Principle 10 will require that, for all 
Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects, the bank must require the borrower 
to disclose the EPs related assessment documentation for the project online.
419
 The new 
“Annex B - Minimum Reporting Requirements” will also provide for additional reporting 
by EPs banks: (i) Data Reporting (similar to the reporting requirements currently in place 
under EP II); (ii) Implementation Reporting for the first year of adoption, and thereafter 
                                                 
416
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417
 Frequently asked Questions, supra note 413 at 5.  
 
418
 See the “Scope” Section of the EP III. EP III, supra note 411. The Scope Section also notes that the EP 
III will apply to bridge loans of less than two years that are intended to be refinanced by project finance or 
a project-related corporate loan that meets the relevant criteria. Specifically excluded from the definition of 
Project-Related Corporate Loans, however, are export finance or supplier credit loans; asset finance 
acquisition finance; hedging; leasing; letters of credit; general corporate purpose loans; and general 
working capital expenditures (and any other loans that are not related to financing of an underlying 
project).  
 
419
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as deemed relevant by the banks (this requires the bank to report on its implementation of 
the EPs, including the mandate of the EPs related staff and their responsibilities, level of 
senior management involvement and incorporation of the EPs in their credit and risk 
management policies); and (iii) Project-Specific Data Reporting (including project name, 
sector, region and the year of project financial close).
420
  
There is no question that these developments will provide an improvement over 
EP II.
421
 Even BankTrack concedes this point, and acknowledges the steps forward in the 
areas of scope extension and the commitment to report on and disclose more project 
specific information.
422
 However, for some commentators, including BankTrack, these 
steps do not go far enough.  On this point, for example, it is observed that the defining 
criteria for the inclusion of “Project-Related Corporate Loans” is very specific, meaning 
that it is unlikely that many more loans will be captured under the EP III framework than 
is currently the case under EP II. The EPs Association justifies this restrictive position by 
stating that “[i]n general, financial institutions have a lesser degree of influence/leverage 
over a project financed through a Corporate Loan. There is also a higher degree of 
competition with financial institutions in certain geographies including those that are not 
EP adopters. Furthermore loans are often arranged in a shorter timescale meaning that 
parts of the EP framework would require a different approach.”423 
                                                 
420
 See “Annex B” of EP III, Ibid.  
 
421
 See e.g. the online article by lawyers of international law firm Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, available at: 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/80287/equator-principles-iii-is-approved-and-
launched-new-trends-and-a-strategy-rethink  
 
422
 See e.g., “BankTrack comments on draft Equator Principles III, Tiny steps forward, where bold moves 
are required” Oct 11 2012 [Bold Moves], available online at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/show/news/banktrack_comments_on_draft_equator_principles_iii  
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Similarly, the Project-Specific Data reporting will be subject to obtaining the 
borrower’s consent and will only be applicable to projects that have closed successfully 
(this is an important qualification because it means that the requirement will not apply 
where the borrower refuses consent or where projects are denied for financing because 
they fail to meet the EPs criteria). As a result, even the EPs Association concedes that this 
enhanced transparency is an important but incomplete step; and acknowledges that it will 
take both time and experience to create a level playing field in the area of transparency 
and accountability.
424
  
As noted above, the full impact of the EP III update process remains to be seen. 
Critics continue to doubt that the EP III will have achieved meaningful improvements 
and BankTrack, in particular, has argued that “bigger steps must be taken by the 
Association if the new Equator Principles are to become a leading initiative on 
sustainable finance.”425 However, it is submitted here that BankTrack’s argument that the 
EPs Association is prepared to take only “tiny steps where bold moves are required”426 
appears overly aggressive and likely goes too far. The EPs Association has clearly 
confirmed its commitment to improving the principles with EP III as a work in progress 
and member banks continue to devote their own significant resources and efforts to this 
endeavor. Although not yet a perfect mechanism for ensuring positive social and 
environmental outcomes, the EPs represent a significant effort in this regard and 
represent an opportunity to examine how this form of CSR works in practice. The EP III 
                                                 
424
 Ibid at 13. 
 
425
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update process may represent only a small step forward in this area but, clearly, it 
represents a further step in the right direction.  
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